Losing Vietnam Read Online Free PDF Page B

intelligent officer, the former airborne division commander, with decades of military experience. A combat-proven officer, he appeared perfect for the job, since he had the respect and loyalty of the officer corps and he could work with President Thieu. Working with the president was not easy. Vien’s complete lack of political ambition was undoubtedly an important factor in their continuing relationship.
    The chief of staff was Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, who doubled as the chief of the Central Logistics Command (CLC). He had a phenomenal grasp of logistical matters and was an innovator. His Joint Staff was competent across the board, but two officers stood out. Brigadier General Tho, the J-3, was a superior officer who grasped situations quickly and also had Vien’s complete confidence. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, the J-2, was also extremely competent. These two officers made a great team.
    The military was well supplied with ammunition, petroleum, and rations. The RVNAF’s Vietnamization was causing problems with supply procedures, particularly spare parts and maintenance. Thus, there were considerable equipment deadlines. However, the DAO had many U.S. contractors on hand attempting to take up the slack.
    The procurement, storage, maintenance, distribution, and transportation of supplies and equipment for a force of over 1 million troops was a formidable undertaking. Particularly when under the Vietnamization program and the pre-cease-fire PROJECT ENHANCE, much equipment was introduced and turned over to the RVNAF in a short period of time. Yet, they managed adequately. The CLC directed and supervised all logistical aspects. 27 Lieutenant General Khuyen headed the Central Logistics Command. The DAO was established primarily to assist the Vietnamese in the critical logistics support area, and it effectively monitored the situation, working closely with the Central Logistics Command. Besides its in-house experts, the DAO provided contract assistance in many critical areas—particularly with respect to aircraft maintenance. In late 1973 there were more than 215 Department of Defense contracts, valued at about $144 million, utilizing about 12,200 contract personnel (Americans, locals, and third-country nationals). 26
    The responsibility for supervising training activities and operating the school and training center system was with the chief of the Central Training Command, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Bao Tri, a member of the JGS. The training system was advanced and almost a mirror image of the one in the United States. It had eight national training centers and nineteen service schools as well as air force and naval training centers. Thecenters taught basic combat training and advanced individual training. The schools had officer and noncommissioned officer training courses, and there was a national military academy. Many of the personnel in positions of responsibility had been trained in the United States. Compared to the one in Cambodia, the South Vietnamese system was very advanced. In all, the Central Training Command supervised some sixty training centers and schools.
Firepower and Mobility
    Toward the end of 1972 it became readily apparent to all that a Paris treaty was in the making, and this set both sides into motion to increase their combat power as they jockeyed for position prior to the signing. The allies, too, learned from the Easter Offensive, in which the awesome firepower of the U.S. Air Force saved the situation. The offensive’s most important lesson was that if the Vietnamization program was to be successful, a tremendous effort was required to enhance the firepower and mobility of the military, in order to replace that of the departing U.S. forces. 28 Therefore, the Pentagon undertook projects to accelerate the delivery of equipment to improve combat capabilities. The U.S. Army Matériel Command initiated PROJECT ENHANCE after the 1972 Easter Offensive to replace the heavy losses in equipment and the