Losing Vietnam Read Online Free PDF Page A

artillery. In 1967 the RVNAF had 643,000 personnel under arms, and in 1973, as the allied contingents were drawn down, to offset the loss of the allied forces this number increased to 1.2 million authorized troops. After the peace accord was signed, the Ministry of National Defense intended to reduce the size of the RVNAF. However, the continuation of hostilities after the cease-fire precluded this, and there was only a small downsizing of 100,000 men to an approved force size of 1.1 million. Yet, this was less a reduction than an increase in the quality of the armed forces. 24
    The ARVN, the regular ground combat organization, was composed of eleven infantry divisions, an airborne division, and the marine corps division. Additionally, there were seven ranger groups. Artillery and armor supported these thirteen divisions. The approximate number of ARVN personnel in these combat units totaled 210,000: eleven infantry divisions, 105,000; an airborne division, 12,000; a marinedivision, 14,000; rangers, 28,000; artillery, 36,000 (including 23,000 troops assigned to divisions); and armor, 15,000. 18
    The territorial forces included the regional forces (RF) and the popular forces (PF). After Tet, the JGS placed the territorial forces under ARVN control, and the United States agreed to upgrade their equipment. The regional forces’ basic operating unit was the hundred-man company. Many of these were organized into battalions, consisting of four companies each; later in the war these were provided mobile assets. The regional forces generally operated within their own provinces. The popular force operated in platoons of twenty-nine men each, generally within their own districts, villages, or hamlets. The regional force units had more equipment, better training, and more competent leadership than the popular force units. Although it was normal to group the two organizations together, the regional forces were much better qualified in terms of combat capability. Their ranks were filled mostly from local recruiting, and what these troops lacked in combat capability they made up for with their knowledge of local areas. These added another 500,000 troops of varying quality and capabilities: 145,000 in regional force battalions, 155,000 among other regional forces, and 200,000 in popular force units. 18
    Although the ground combat troops (ARVN, RF, PF) numbered about 710,000 soldiers in January 1973, only the army and, to a much lesser extent, the regional force battalions could be considered for deployment to meet enemy combat initiatives anywhere. Thus, more than 50 percent of the ground combat units were primarily disposed in a static defensive posture and were then primarily reactive forces, since it was almost a requirement that the twelve thousand South Vietnamese hamlets had to be protected and the civilian population kept under government control to coincide with President Thieu’s policy of losing no population.
    The combat support slice, or the necessary personnel to keep combat units in line, amounted to about 328,000 troops. Although these essential units were located throughout the country, the major logistical installations were primarily in the vicinity of Saigon. At any one time the personnel absent from units was about 150,000 soldiers, of which 70,000 were in training.
    The approximate overall strength of the South Vietnamese forces at the time of the cease-fire included 210,000 in ARVN/Marine combatunits, 145,000 in regional force battalions, 355,000 in other RF/PFs, 328,000 in ARVN support troops, 64,000 in the Vietnamese Air Force, and 41,000 in the Vietnamese Navy, for a total of 1,143,000 soldiers. 18 Subsequent to the cease-fire, the ARVN was chronically understrength. Although the government had passed a general mobilization law, after about a decade of intense conflict the manpower resources were drying up. Considering the demographics of South Vietnam’s population of 20 million, the number of physically