Losing Vietnam Read Online Free PDF

fit males reaching draft age yearly was probably between 120,000 and 130,000. This should have been enough to maintain a force structure of 1.1 million soldiers. In fact, most observers thought that manpower was not a problem. Yet, it was always a matter of grave concern. South Vietnam had serious difficulties in controlling its manpower. Considering the constant enemy attacks against isolated hamlets and villages, the constant flow of displaced persons, the large urban buildup, and the efforts of draftable youths to evade military service, manpower control difficulties were understandable. The ARVN had continuous attrition because of combat losses and other casualties, discharges, elimination of the unfit, and desertions. By far the most serious drain on manpower was desertions. Efforts to round up draft dodgers and to recover deserters were ineffective. Deserters blended into the overcrowded cities undetected. Some joined the People’s Self Defense Force (PSDF) to avoid ARVN combat duty. In 1973 there were 215,023 desertions, 20 percent of the assigned strength. The total losses per month averaged 2.5 percent, of which two-thirds were desertions. 25 There were other personnel problems—such as ghost soldiers, nonexistent names that were nonetheless carried on the rolls; flower soldiers, who were carried on the rolls but were off elsewhere; and those who were absent without leave for prolonged periods—but the desertion rate was by far the most important.
    These personnel problems manifested themselves in a chronic shortfall of troops present for duty in combat units. Demographics made it difficult to make up for the loss of manpower resulting from combat losses, desertions, and discharges. Therefore, on the average, combat units had assigned about 85 percent of their authorized strength, and those present for duty were often about 85 percent of the assigned strength. Combat is a team effort; when there are too many soldiers not present for duty, unit effectiveness suffers. Combat units with fewerthan 70 percent present for duty are not considered combat effective. Each army infantry battalion generally had an authorized strength of 639 soldiers. Therefore, unit commanders continuously made major efforts to ensure a foxhole strength of at least 450 combatants.
    While personnel strengths were a problem, at the senior levels the leadership of the ARVN was good. Most major commanders had been trained at U.S. Army branch schools in the United States, and many were command and staff college graduates. Yet, President Thieu assigned some of the key command billets to officers whose loyalty he could count on, and several of these were considered incompetent. Some of the senior officers lacked the ability to make hurried and decisive decisions in stressful situations. The junior officers lacked the experience of those in higher echelons, but almost all had been battle tested. The intense combat in 1972 had resulted in many companygrade leader casualties. The inadequate pay and long separations from families hurt the morale of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Those who had their families close by could not make ends meet. However, in 1973 the overall morale was satisfactory, considering that the war had been going for longer than eight years and showed no signs of ending.
    At the national level the South Vietnamese JGS was organized on normal general staff principles. However, the commander of the air force and the chief of naval operations appeared only at the operational level, as did the commanding generals of the four corps. By and large there were few air force and naval personnel at the staff level, which reflected the actual state of the armed forces. Thus it was mostly an army organization instead of a true joint staff.
    I had worked with the JGS in 1968–1969 and was very pleased to resume my friendships—particularly with Gen. Cao Van Vien and Brigadier General Tho. Vien was a quiet,