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engaging the bulk of the Wehrmacht on the Continent.
    Since planners could not plan unless they had a definite target, Eisenhower argued that, if the British did not agree, “we must turn our backs upon the Eastern Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan!” This threat to abandon the British if they refused tofollow American strategic conceptions would later be used by Marshall and King. It had a hollow ring to it. Commander in Chief Roosevelt never gave it serious consideration and it is doubtful if even the War Department did. Certainly there was never enough detailed planning done to make the threat believable. The Americans were simply too impressed by the logic of their own arguments about the strategic advantages of fighting in Europe, Germany was so obviously the major threat, Japan’s resources were so clearly limited, and American historic, cultural, and economic interests were so much more important in Europe than in Asia, that it would have been inconceivable for the United States to turn its back upon Europe “and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan!”
    There were, to be sure, deep emotional currents in the United States that would have supported such a switch in grand strategy. The country had been humiliated at Pearl Harbor. The men of Bataan had evoked a response of admiration and a determination to avenge them. The racist overtones to the war in the Pacific made that conflict, in the eyes of millions of Americans, more important than the war in Europe. Finally, at the time Eisenhower made the threat, the Japanese were winning everywhere. But none of these factors, real as they were, negated the basic arguments Eisenhower developed earlier about the advantages of Europe as the main theater.
    In his late February memorandum, Eisenhower emphasized the overriding reason for a Europe-first strategy. The fundamental fact of World War II, from June 21, 1941, onwards, was the Russo-German war. Here was where the major forces were engaged, where the greatest killing was done, where the stakes were highest. Whoever won on Germany’s eastern front would win the war. On the banks of the Volga, where Germany had made by far her largest commitment, and not in the South China Sea or in the central Pacific or even in the desert around Tobruk, the issue would be decided. Under the circumstances, the first priority for the Western Allies was to keep Russia in the war.
    To do so, Eisenhower declared, it was necessary to provide maximum material aid through lend-lease and to “conduct such operations as will directly and indirectly assist in taking the pressure off of the Russian Armies.” The threat of the build-up in England would help accomplish this, as would direct support of the Middle East, by keeping Germany and Japan separated and denying to Germany badly needed oil. But the major help the Allies could give would be in opening a second front. Eisenhower felt that if this could not be done in the summer of 1942,then the Allies should send more of their major strength into the Middle East. He realized this would delay the opening of the second front, but “if the diversion must be made, we should realize it promptly and act accordingly.” 21
    Nothing in Eisenhower’s program was new. Marshall had long since been advancing its major provisions. The memorandum did swing the War Department’s attention back to Europe, and at Marshall’s request Eisenhower, on February 28, submitted a fuller, more formal study. He included most of his arguments from his earlier memorandum but made significant additions. He began by pointing out that “time works in our favor. The hostile power is now at its maximum, ours will grow—provided none of the principal members of the United Powers is defeated and forced to capitulate.”
    The main thrust of Eisenhower’s argument was to differentiate between operations which were “
necessary
to the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers” and