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to secure the North American citadel, maintain England, assist Russia to stay in the war, and secure the Indian-Middle East position. He realized that there were many other tasks that would contribute greatly to the goal, but classified them as “highly desirable” rather than as a “must,” resting his classification on a rule used in OPD: “Will the loss of the particular area render our strategic situation so desperate as to make an eventual victory practically impossible?” Under that criterion, the Southwest Pacific was only very important, not vital.
    Eisenhower’s second question was, where could an eventual offensive be launched that would do most toward defeating the Axis? His answer was short: “An attack through Western Europe.” He then developed the detailed reasoning behind the proposal. The major Allied problem was shortage of ships and an attack through western Europe involved the shortest possible sea routes, thus placing “
a minimum strain upon shipping
.” The sea lanes to England had to be maintained in order to feed the British whether or not an American build-up in England took place, so creating a theater in western Europe did not involve dispersion of escorting vessels for ships. The base for the proposed theater would be England; if the United States immediately began building up air and ground forces on the island it would constitute a threat which Germany could not ignore, thus forcing the enemy to leave some of its divisions in France and thereby aiding the Russians. Land communications in western Europe were superior to those available “in any other areafrom which either enemy can be attacked.” England already had airfields from which a large air force could operate to secure air superiority, a
sine qua non
of a successful assault. “Nowhere else is there such a base, so favorably situated with respect to either of our enemies.”
    In conclusion, Eisenhower emphasized that the recommendation offered “the only feasible method for employing offensively a major portion of the British combat power.” If a large offensive were attempted elsewhere, the British would have to keep a large proportion of their forces at home, “useless, except for the protection of that island.” Finally, Eisenhower scribbled by hand, “It attempts to attack our principal enemy while he is engaged on several fronts; hence speed in preparation is important.”
    Eisenhower’s plan was bold and imaginative, and—for 1942 at least—impossible. Like his countrymen, when he was confronted with a problem Eisenhower tended to overcome it through the most direct and quickest method possible. The United States had been in the war for only three months, had no combat-ready divisions in England, could expect to get no more than a dozen there by the end of the year, had a quarter-trained, inadequately equipped air force that had practically no combat experience, a Navy whose principal fighting ships rested at the bottom of the sea and which had hardly any assault landing craft, and a General Staff that was in the midst of a badly needed reorganization. Yet Eisenhower was proposing that this nation immediately plan to come to grips with the mighty Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in an all-out campaign on the plains of northwestern Europe.
    Eisenhower did recognize certain possible objections, chief of which was “the difficulty of organizing, on the shores of Western Europe, a force of sufficient strength to meet the hostile opposition that could be brought against it.” To be successful, he realized, the plan needed the complete and enthusiastic support of the CCS, overwhelming air support, ample landing craft, and sufficient shipping to support the operation. And, the Allies would have to husband their combat power “to acquire the necessary strength, and avoid the evils of unjustified dispersion.” In short, Eisenhower wanted to skip that part of Churchill’s program that called for closing the ring before