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those which “are merely
desirable
.” In the first category he placed the maintenance of the United Kingdom, the retention of Russia in the war, and the safety of the India-Middle East theater. Things which were merely desirable were, in order of priority, security of Alaska, holding bases west and southwest of Hawaii, security of Burma, security of South America, security of Australia, and maintaining the trans-African air route. Eisenhower insisted that the distinction between the necessary and the desirable had to be “rigidly observed,” and that the Allies hold strictly to the principle that “
minima
should be diverted to secondary or merely desirable objectives, while
maxima
are to be striven for in primary, essential, operations.”
    In the case of helping Russia, Eisenhower argued that it would not be sufficient to urge upon the Soviets the indirect advantages that would accrue to them from Allied operations in remote theaters, nor would it suffice to step up lend-lease. The United States could not expect to win the war by paying others to do the fighting. “
Russia’s problem is to sustain herself during the coming summer
,” Eisenhower declared, “and she must not be permitted to reach such a precarious position that she will accept a negotiated peace, no matter how unfavorable to herself, in preference to a continuation of the fight.” The Western Allies had to initiate operations that would draw off sizable portions of the Wehrmacht; the operations had to be “
so conceived, and so presented to the Russians, that they will recognize the importance of the support rendered
.” An immediate air offensive from England against Germany, with a ground offensive to follow, “
is indicated
.”
    The Eisenhower program represented a compromise between two schools of thought then current in Washington. Some War Department officers, especially in the Army Air Force, were arguing that the United States should abandon Australia and New Zealand, pull all the way back to Hawaii, build a passive defense there, and throw everything else into Europe. In the Navy there was strong sentiment, shared to a certain extent by Admiral King, to leave Europe to the British and go all out in Asia. Eisenhower’s middle way became the accepted strategy, partly because it reflected Marshall’s and Roosevelt’s thinking, partly because it was the most logical—what was the point of using dreadfully scarce shipping to pull troops out of an unthreatened Australia?
    Eisenhower used his strongest arguments against the Asia-first advocates. He pointed out that both the War and Navy Departments had long ago agreed that in case of a two-ocean war the United States would make its major offensive effort in Europe. He realized that some Navy Department officials now wanted to change that commitment. Their latest argument was that it was a strategic axiom that, when a divided enemy was encountered, the weaker portion should be attacked and defeated first, and in this war the European Axis was far stronger than the Japanese. Eisenhower denounced such reasoning as “without validity.” Military estimates, he pointed out, were based on “
relative power at a particular point
of actual or possible contact.” Japan was relatively stronger in Asia than Germany and Italy were in Europe, both because of the Japanese geographical position and because of the relatively small force that could be brought to bear and maintained against her. “This is particularly true as long as Russia is in the war.”
    If the Russo-German war was the first fact of World War II, until 1944 the second was to be the relative scarcity of British-American shipping, because it made it difficult for America to exert her great strength. Thus, in addition to all the other arguments in favor of a European rather than Asian offensive, the final, unanswerable one was, “To conduct a war in East Asia requires, for the same number of troops to be maintained there by U.S. and