might seek to bolster the morale of his own armies by revealing in broadly reported speeches their strategy of maneuver and feint. The fall of Atlanta had certainly crushed Confederate morale, and Davis had reacted by traveling to various parts of his army, a mission of reassurance that
all would turn out fine
. But far beyond reassurances, Davis spoke openly to vast audiences of John Bell Hood’s attempts to draw Sherman out of Georgia by driving northward into Tennessee, severing crucial supply lines, drawing Sherman’s army into utter destruction, if not by starvation then by the sheer might of Hood’s army.
Grant had been baffled by Davis’s optimism, since Sherman had soundly whipped Hood in nearly every encounter around Atlanta. And Grant agreed with the War Department that the remnants of Hood’s army, still a formidable force, should be dealt with once and for all, and not just left to its own planning. Sherman didn’t agree, something Grant knew to expect. Once Davis began giving his speeches, Grant understood what Sherman was insisting upon, that Hood would do what Davis suggested and move north to threaten middle Tennessee. If Sherman pushed his pursuit of Hood away from Atlanta, following him through Alabama or Tennessee, that would accomplish exactly what Davis had suggested publicly: Sherman would be removed from Georgia. Sherman had already predicted that Hood would move away, would strike out for new victories against a weaker foe, or some vulnerable outpost. Nashville seemedthe logical place, and Sherman had addressed that supposition by sending enough force with George Thomas to defy any significant push from Hood. Grant had assisted as well, ordering added strength toward central Tennessee from Federal forces in every part of the Union, including a vast new ocean of recruits.
The War Department still fidgeted, wondering if Hood’s hints of movement northward were only demonstration, deception that might somehow endanger Sherman around Atlanta. But Grant knew better. Davis would not stand up and lie to his entire army. It wasn’t the man’s way, would fly in the face of Southern honor for their president to be so publicly deceptive. And now Hood was shifting northward, exactly as Sherman had predicted. It had been one of the most convincing arguments Sherman could make that his own operations should proceed as he designed them. Before Hood could destroy Sherman’s supply lines to Nashville, Sherman did most of it for him. It was Sherman’s plan, eliminating any possibility that a raid by Forrest or anyone else could threaten Sherman from behind.
The last train northward from Atlanta had moved out on November 12, the same day the final telegraph link was cut. With Sherman now in motion east of Atlanta, he was opening up an even larger gap with Hood’s army, an army that Sherman had already thrashed. By now it was clear that Davis’s speeches had been accurate, and Hood’s intentions were plain. From the Confederate base in northern Alabama, Hood was intending to march north.
Grant smiled again, stared out into darkness. Yes, Sherman, that will suit you quite well. Keep the prying eyes away from your backside. Whatever you’re doing down there, they’ll still be stewing up here, mouthing off their fears that your army is facing certain doom. The newspapers love that sort of thing. All those military geniuses wringing their hands how you’re violating every textbook. Well, Sherman, I remember the old man doing the same. You weren’t there, which is a damn shame, because you’d have appreciated what it meant to take ten thousand men into the middle of Mexico and push up against thirty thousand who sat behind big stone walls. And by God, it worked.
He thought of Winfield Scott now, the man who had brought a flock of young lieutenants right out of West Point and, with completefaith in their ability to command, had led them to victory in Mexico. We’re not lieutenants anymore, Grant thought,