The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance Read Online Free PDF Page B

government was going to need them back for the defence of Britain if everything went badly.
    The second priority order was to keep the French king, Louis XVIII, both safe and close to Wellington’s headquarters. The post-war government of France had not yet been decided. Some diplomats wanted France to become a republic, arguing that this would at least give stability; others wanted Napoleon’s son to take over – the young child would be easily steered by ‘advisers’ appointed by the allies; others supported Louis. The British government favoured Louis, who for all his faults was the legitimate monarch, and wanted to make sure that he was on the spot in Paris after the war to be able to take power if that is what the allies decided to do.
     
    Napoleon’s options
     
    Faced by this impressive mass of armies and states ranged against him, Napoleon soon realized that he had only limited options. By recalling veterans to the colours and mobilising garrison troops, Napoleon was able to get 198,000 men ready to march by late in May, with 66,000 more being equipped and probably ready by the middle of June. By early July he might have been able to muster as many as 450,000 men. The problem with waiting for these impressive numbers to be gathered, however, was that the allies were bringing up their armies just as rapidly.
    Napoleon knew that whenever the fighting began, he was going to be heavily outnumbered by the allies gathering against him. If he stood on the defensive behind France’s borders of the Pyrenees, Alps and Rhine he would be able to fight a long defensive campaign, but the final result was hardly in doubt. In the end Napoleon would be defeated. Before that it was likely that there might be a coup back in Paris organized by those who did not want to see France fought over yet again.
    If Napoleon was going to win the coming war he calculated that he had to win a quick, impressive victory that would cow the other allies into making a hasty peace treaty. Knowing as he did the disputes that had been taking place between the allies at the recent Congress of Vienna, Napoleon hoped that a swift victory would reopen these disputes. If he could knock out the Prussian army, for instance, the Austrians might be tempted to occupy Saxony. Such an aggressive move by the Austrians would undoubtedly cause the Russians to fall back to defend their gains in Poland. There might even be war between Russia and Austria.
    Napoleon needed a victory – and he needed one quickly. Looking around at his enemies he very quickly reached a decision as to where that victory was to be won.
    The Spanish were on the far side of the Pyrenees and had not yet mustered. They could be beaten with ease, but it would be a hollow and unimpressive victory that would not shake the coalition ranged against Napoleon. Much the same reasoning ruled out an attack into northern Italy to defeat the Austro-Italian army commanded by Frimont.
    Schwarzenberg’s large Austrian army on the Rhine offered possibilities, for if Napoleon could crush an army of 150,000 men or more it would be a real blow to the allies. But that victory by itself would achieve little. With the vast Russian army ponderously rolling west through Germany, Napoleon would have little time to exploit his victory before he would need to fight a second and even more powerful foe.
    Rather more tempting were the armies of Wellington and Blücher in the Netherlands. Napoleon knew that a sound defeat of the Prussians might very well split apart the coalition formed against him. Moreover, there were weaknesses in the positions adopted by Wellington and Blücher.
    For a start there was no natural barrier protecting the front of the two allies. Frimont had the Alps, Schwarzenberg had the Rhine; but Blücher and Wellington had only the Sambre – a river that was bridged in many places and also had several fords.
    Secondly, both armies were scattered across the southern Netherlands (now Belgium). This