only because the British fleet backed him in order to retain Sicily as a useful naval base in the central Mediterranean. Nobody, least of all Exmouth, expected much from the Sicilian army.
Some other nations were making token preparations, but with no real prospect of taking part in the coming war. Portugal, for instance, was putting together an army of 14,000 veterans. However, they did not have clearance to march through Spain to reach France, nor had they got the permission of King John VI. John was rather inconveniently on a tour of the interior of Brazil and nobody could get hold of him. Without their monarch’s permission the army could not go to war.
The Danish army seemed rather more promising, but it was small and had trouble producing weapons for its men. King Frederick VI thought his forces might be ready to march sometime early in July, though in the event it was the end of that month before they left Denmark.
British and Prussian forces
Of all the armies promised by the allies only two would certainly be ready by the agreed date of 1 July. The first of these was the main Prussian army under the command of Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher. Blücher had a force of 116,000 men mustered in the Netherlands by early June. He had his headquarters in Namur, but problems with supply and accommodation meant that the army was spread over a large band of territory stretching from Liège to near Charleroi.
The four corps of the Prussian army varied in size between 23,000 and 30,000. Each corps was a balanced body of infantry, cavalry and artillery – in effect, a miniature army. The men were mostly veterans, though there was a large minority of recent recruits. As all the men came from Prussia there was no doubt of their willingness to fight for their king.
Blücher was 73 years old in 1815, but he was fit and active in body and had a sharp mind. He was, moreover, respected by his generals and loved by his men who nicknamed him ‘Marshal Forwards’ after his favourite command. His aggressive nature was matched by an ability to organize an army with ruthless efficiency. Indeed, as commander of an army, Blücher had only been defeated once – at Lübeck in 1806. Even then Blücher had managed to persuade his French opponent to mount a guard of honour to salute the defeated Prussians.
Also in the Netherlands by early June was an army of 93,000 men under the British duke of Wellington. Most of these men were British, but there were also substantial allied units. Of these, the most reliable and best trained were probably the King’s German Legion. This unit was recruited mostly from Hanoverians, the king of Britain at this date being also the ruler of Hanover. Almost as good were the Brunswickers, led by their duke, Frederick William – known as ‘the black duke’, due to his swarthy good looks and the jet-black uniforms of his men.
Wellington also commanded the Netherlands troops, led by their prince, William of Orange. Until little over a year earlier the Netherlands had been enthusiastic partisans of Napoleon and the revolutionary reforms. Nobody was entirely certain how reliable they would be in the coming campaign, however.
This large army was, like that of Blücher and for similar reasons, spread out across the western Netherlands. The right-wing units were near Braine-le-Comte, while the left wing was around Brussels.
Unknown to Blücher, Wellington had two orders from the British government to which he had to give absolute priority no matter what the circumstances. The first was to keep the British part of his mixed army intact. If there was a real possibility of defeat, Wellington was to retreat to the Scheldt Estuary, where the Royal Navy was waiting to evacuate his troops. The British government was aware that the grand alliance was fragile and had no intention of needlessly sacrificing the only large British army in existence. Almost all available troops had been sent to Wellington, and the
Elizabeth Hunter, Grace Draven
Nelson DeMille, Thomas H. Block