The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance Read Online Free PDF Page A

indicative of the fraught state of international relations that the Swiss government was uncertain of which foreign power they should be more afraid – the French or the Austrians. Whichever might turn out to be the real enemy, the Swiss were taking no chances. They told their allies that they would keep the French tied down and under observation, though effectively this meant they were not going to join in the invasion of France.
    In northern Italy another Austrian army was gathering under General Johann Frimont, a talented cavalry commander who had fought against Napoleon – though with little success – at Marengo in 1800. Serving under Frimont were the troops of several north Italian states. Other than those from Piedmont, however, it was not entirely certain how reliable these Italian troops were going to be. The Italians had fought alongside the forces of France for years and were known to favour the new freedoms the Revolution had brought them. The return of their autocratic rulers was not generally welcomed, and the soldiers might not be too willing to fight.
    Nevertheless, Frimont had around 70,000 men under arms. His orders were to cross the French border on 1 July and secure the pro-royalist areas of Provence, together with the major ports of Toulon and Marseilles, before marching north up the Rhône Valley to Lyons. It was this army that the duke of Angoulême had been hoping would march to his aid, but it had not – and so the royalist rising in Provence never took off.
     
    Neapolitan War
     
    Frimont had other problems to contend with. When news spread of Napoleon’s landing in southern France, southern Italy exploded in a fever of revolutionary fervour. If northern Italy was unreliable for the allies, southern Italy was positively hostile to them. Joachim Murat, king of Naples, wasted no time at all in declaring war on Austria and calling on all Italians to rally to the cause of the freedoms that the revolutionary era had brought them. Austria wanted to reimpose the old rulers, but Murat would kick them out.
     

    Equestrian Portrait of Joachim Murat by Antoine-Jean Gros, c.1812, oil on canvas, Louvre Museum
    Murat began by invading the Papal States with an army of about 50,000 men and 90 cannon. The pope fled and Murat was welcomed by cheering crowds. He marched on to Ancona, Rimini and Bologna. There were localized outbreaks of rioting and unrest in northern Italy, but Frimont’s troops quickly restored order. Frimont sent an army south under General Frederick Bianchi to block Murat’s march north. At the Battle of Panaro on 3 April, Murat smashed the Austrian army and marched on into Modena and Florence. Five days later Murat was on the banks of the Po river.
    As the situation threatened to spiral out of control, Frimont marched almost his entire army towards Ferrara, then being besieged by Murat. At the Battle of Casaglia on 12 April the fighting was inconclusive, but Murat – suffering supply problems – fell back towards Bologna, then on to Ancona. Murat fought a skilful retreat, but he was outnumbered and handicapped by his lack of supplies. On 20 May Naples surrendered. There was no sign of Murat. Nobody knew where he had gone.
    This Neapolitan War, as it was known, had seriously dislocated Frimont’s plans for an invasion of southern France. Most of his army was spread out over Italy, garrisoning unreliable towns and seeking to overawe revolutionaries – and intimidate them into inaction. Without knowing where Murat had gone or what his plans might be, Frimont could not afford to relax. He gathered as many of his men as he dared in Piedmont, but he was still under strength and was worried about his rear.
    Intending to co-operate with Frimont in his invasion of southern France was the British Mediterranean fleet under Lord Exmouth. On board Exmouth’s ships were troops of King Ferdinand III of Sicily. Ferdinand was one of the most reactionary monarchs in Europe. He had held on to his throne