Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings Read Online Free PDF Page A

committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany as the prime objective, the next question was how to achieve that goal. The report laid out a comprehensive strategy that listed seven “offensive policies” that would be applied to Germany. It was much too generalized to be called a “plan,” but it did illustrate an overall strategic vision. Those seven policies included a blockade of the continent, the bombing of Germany from the air, the conduct of raids on the periphery of Hitler’s empire, and support forthe occupied nations. Only near the end did the report mention a military buildup “for an eventual offensive against Germany” itself. 18
    It is immediately evident that this program outlined a passive and peripheral strategy—the kind of indirect approach that the British had used against Napoleon’s empire a century and a half earlier. Of course, anything more ambitious than that would have required military assets far beyond anything the British possessed in early 1941, and the Americans, who were not yet in the war, were in no position to push for anything more direct. Nevertheless, two aspects of this strategic blueprint deserve special scrutiny. One was the third goal on the list, which was “The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.” That seemed to contradict the guiding principle that Germany was the “preeminent” foe. If a conflict with Japan could be deferred until later, why didn’t that same assumption apply to Italy? Very likely the reason was that in early 1941, the delegates perceived Italy as a weaker opponent whose defeat was within the theoretical reach of their limited assets, while the defeat of Germany was not. Nevertheless, the identification of Italy as a preliminary step on the road to Germany was thus implanted early in Allied strategic thinking and planning. 19
    The other noteworthy element in this list of “offensive policies” was the objective of capturing “positions from which to launch the eventual offensive” against Germany. This implied that the Allies did not
already
possess such positions—that, in other words, the “eventual” offensive against Germany would be launched not from the British Isles but from some other, as yet unidentified and currently uncaptured position. When connected with the goal of the “early” defeat of Italy, these two objectives foreshadowed the subsequent Allied campaign into North Africa and the Mediterranean. It is not clear whether the wording of either of these strategic goals signaled a deliberate attempt by the British to avoid a commitment to a direct assault on Germany from bases in England or whether they simply represented early and unfocused thinking constrained by limited resources. What is clear is that despite Roosevelt’s insertion of the made-up word “navally” into the initial guidelines, the British were already thinking of attacking what Churchill would later label Europe’s “soft underbelly.” 20
    There was some evidence that the delegates were paying attention to the inevitable command problems that were likely to arise when four servicesfrom two nations sought to execute a coordinated military campaign. The Americans, historically wary of placing U.S. soldiers under foreign command, made sure to include a cautionary note: “As a general rule, the forces of each of the Associated Powers should operate under their own commander.” And if a theater strategic commander somehow did end up controlling the forces of another nation, he was not to disperse national units but keep them unified so that, as much as possible, they could remain under the command of their own officers. 21
    One important outgrowth of the ABC conversations was the agreement to establish formal and permanent military missions in each capital. Each country agreed to send a senior admiral and a senior general to the capital of the other. Roosevelt had already sent Ghormley to London as an observer, but such representatives