Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings Read Online Free PDF

would now do much more than merely observe, for the new heads of mission were to engage in “collaboration in the formulation of Military Policies and plans” with their host nation, as well as “represent their own individual Military services.” It was not quite a formal alliance, and the United States was still technically neutral, but the ligaments of unity were growing and strengthening. 22
    The lengthy report (twelve single-spaced typed pages plus another fifty-four pages of annexes), dated March 27, 1941, made the usual rounds in both capitals. In Washington, Secretary of the Navy Knox initialed his approval on May 23, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson gave his okay on June 2. But underneath those was a third notation, also handwritten: “Not Approved by President.” It was not that Roosevelt disagreed with the report’s conclusions or recommendations. After all, he had already indicated his strong support of a Germany-first strategy in case of war, and he believed that having a contingency plan on the shelf was all to the good. He was unwilling, however, to have his hands tied, or to be formally associated with a document that came perilously close to collaborating with a belligerent power. To this point at least, the Anglo-American partnership, such as it was, was limited to staff-level conversations and kept secret from the general public. 23

    EVEN AS BRITISH AND AMERICAN OFFICERS discussed possible future cooperation against Hitler’s Germany, the U.S. Navy was already at warwith his U-boats in the Atlantic. Only six days after the ABC conference ended, Roosevelt discussed new and more extensive responsibilities for the Navy in the U-boat war. He contemplated bringing more warships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and ordered Stark to prepare an expanded and more aggressive convoy program. The new instruction, which Roosevelt endowed with the Orwellian name of “Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1,” authorized U.S. Navy warships to attack without warning any German U-boat operating in the western half of the Atlantic Ocean. Before it could be implemented, however, Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. That removed one more restraint on the Japanese, and convinced Roosevelt to retain in the Pacific the warships he had considered moving to the Atlantic. Instead, therefore, Roosevelt approved “Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2,” which authorized U.S. Navy warships merely to report the location of U-boats to convoys and to their escorts. Nevertheless, it was one more tentative step toward open warfare between the U.S. surface navy and German undersea hunters. 24
    Then on June 10 came news that a German U-boat (U-69) had sunk a United States merchant steamer, the
Robin Moor
. There had been no casualties, for the German U-boat commander had stopped the
Robin Moor
, demanded to see its papers, and then, deciding that it was carrying contraband goods (some target rifles and ammunition), ordered the passengers and crew to evacuate into lifeboats before sinking the ship. The incident had occurred weeks earlier, but news of it had been delayed until the lifeboats were found and the passengers rescued. Though it lacked the drama and the carnage of the
Lusitania
sinking back in 1915, it was an undeniable casus belli if Roosevelt wanted to make an issue of it. He might have issued an ultimatum, as Wilson had done back when Roosevelt had been his assistant secretary of the Navy. Instead, Roosevelt merely delivered a tough message to Congress that fell well short of an ultimatum. Hitler mostly ignored it. As it happened, he was preoccupied by other issues: two days later his armies plunged into the Soviet Union. 25
    With hindsight, it is evident that Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union while the British remained defiant on their island was the turning point of the Second World War. It meant a two-front war for Germany, andit roused the slumbering Russian bear, which eventually developed into a