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to realize that al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, like many Silicon Valley start-ups, had determined that a flatter management structure worked best, allowing them to adapt to the death or capture of senior leaders. But while al-Qaeda had regenerated each time, it had been forced to rely on leaders with less and less hands-on operational experience. Furthermore, fearing electronic interception, communication between bin Laden and remaining operational leaders had been increasingly restricted; each message spent months in the hands of couriers. In December 2005, US ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker went as far as to claim that bin Laden no longer controlled operations and that al-Qaeda had “run into serious problems.” 1
    A more lethal effort was now seen as the way forward to dismantle al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

LESSONS FOR FUTURE FIND OPERATIONS
     
    Two others additionally appeared on the roster of al-Qaeda’s number 3: Abu Ubaydah al-Masri and Usama al-Kini. Each served as operational commander before and after Abu Layth, respectively. These two men caused great mayhem during their lives, and their dispatch was not a source of much lamentation, except among those in al-Qaeda. Abu Ubaydah played an integral part in the July 2005 London transit bombings, as well as the star-crossed Operation Overt, and al-Kini was integral to the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
    Abu Ubaydah, an expert bomb maker, had the dubious distinction of being the only al-Qaeda number 3 who was neither captured nor killed by American ordinance. Rather, in late 2007, he died from complications from Hepatitis C, a particularly unpleasant way to die. 111
    Usama died on New Year’s Day 2009 in much the same manner as his predecessors—via a Hellfire missile, courtesy of an American UAV. While he was certainly an ambitious leader—he tried to assassinate Benazir Bhutto and was responsible for the Islamabad Marriott bombing in September 2008 that left dozens dead, including the Czech ambassador to Pakistan 112 —relatively little is known publicly about him, aside from his being one of the few al-Qaeda members from Kenya.
    The campaign to neutralize al-Qaeda’s operational commanders forced the US to reorganize many of its existing structures to streamline the find aspect of the find-fix-finish doctrine. By pinpointing al-Qaeda’s operational commander, the US successfully disrupted the organization and communicated the message that taking the reins of a terrorist campaign against the US is very dangerous.
    The intense manhunts showed that finding and eliminating terrorist operatives from the sky offered operational ease but carried certain disadvantages. A militant target could be eliminated in a single operation, whereas on the ground several patient and methodical steps were usually required to get even marginally close to a target. Capture operations on the ground not only demand a greater cooperation with foreign partners and better operational security to prevent leaks, but also increased risk to the human beings involved. However, with aerial elimination there is greater risk of collateral damage, alienation of the local public, and the chilling of the intelligence trail. With the high value target eliminated, analysts lose the chance to repeatedly tap into their expertise and insight as new leaders appear or tactics change, and they have fewer means of reexamining the key assumptions under which they are crafting the analysis. Over the long run, this approach can make efforts to take down a large network increasingly difficult.
    The second lesson is that technological dominance gives the US a critical advantage in cutting off al-Qaeda’s ability to talk, travel, and broadcast its message. Mobile and satellite phone technology, key communication resources for anyone in the twenty-first century, can prove fatal to many in al-Qaeda. The combination of good targeting analysis, sophisticated remote sensors, on-the-ground assets, and