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persistent surveillance tools such as UAVs also made traveling a dangerous activity for al-Qaeda leaders. Propaganda efforts backfired when sophisticated voice analysis and computer-driven terrain mapping revealed key details about where and when a leader spoke.
    The close integration of good collection and analysis can create an operational atmosphere so stifling that terrorist leaders spend most of their time in fear of discovery, rather than successfully carrying off attacks. The more varied the sources of information the US used in tracking wanted operatives—including paid informants, liaison intelligence exchanges, overhead surveillance, and electronic intercepts—the more raw information analysts found at their disposal to understand and dissect the threat.
    Finally, cultivating effective counterterrorism cooperation with foreign partners remains critical to maintaining a decisive advantage and denying terrorists safe haven. It is often difficult work, and sometimes requires a clever mix of intimidation and accommodation. The 2008 escalation of the drone program put suffocating pressure on al-Qaeda but also stirred public resentment and sidestepped the systemic problem of forging a deeper working relationship with Pakistan. When it expanded the program from a narrow effort aimed at decapitating the al-Qaeda leadership to a large-scale campaign of air strikes based on signatures of convoys, safe houses, training camps, and weapon caches, the US waded into a much murkier area. Innocent civilians and marginally aligned militants became victims of US retaliation, significantly expanding the number of individuals who harbor anti-American feelings—individuals who, by the blood of their deceased relatives and the smoking wreckage of their destroyed homes, might later dedicate their lives to striking America. Any number of these people could and may, with time and training, become the next number 3.

THE RECKONING
     
    Zazi’s case figured in one final debate in November 2009 after Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 9/11 mastermind KSM and four of his co-conspirators would be tried in federal court in Manhattan. Attorney General Holder pointed to Zazi’s case as evidence of a successful trial in civilian courts. “In this case, as it has in so many other cases, the criminal justice system has proved to be an invaluable weapon for disrupting plots and incapacitating terrorists, one that works in concert with the IC and our military,” Holder told the press almost immediately after Zazi’s plea. 102
    The Zazi affair highlights the practical and legal difficulties the government has faced since 9/11. Attempting to provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to fight new threats, Congress and the executive branch have lurched toward the creation of legislation and policies that balance civil liberties and security—an ideal that arguably remains out of reach. Working to protect the public, those agencies in turn wrestle with a balance of priorities and power among themselves. But officials have to make hard choices over and over again to continue protecting the public from terrorism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
     
    This book is the product of many people generously providing their time, expertise, and good humor. Certain individuals prefer to remain anonymous for personal and professional reasons, but they have our sincere thanks. We would like to thank our agent, Matthew Carnicelli, for his ability to navigate the choppy waters of the publishing world, as well as the hardworking folks at PublicAffairs who made this book possible: Clive Priddle, Jaime Leifer, Melissa Raymond, and Chrisona Schmidt. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ingrid Gustafson and David Millar, who performed months of research in service of this publication.
    We would also like to thank Spencer Ackerman, Dick Best, Dick Clarke, Jack Cloonan, Charles Cogan, Ken Dilanian, Senator Bob Graham, Jack Goldsmith, Senator