Understanding Air France 447 Read Online Free PDF Page A

the captain’s fitness to fly. The BEA reports did not comment on the activities of the layover, or the duration of it, concluding that the private lives of the pilots were out of the scope of the investigation. But these publications do raise the legitimate question if fatigue could have been a contributing factor to the crew’s inability to properly diagnose and maintain control of the situation.
    About an hour before the autopilot disconnected, the captain offered First Officer Bonin an opportunity to take a nap. One must assume that he had some reason to offer this, such as looking or behaving tired. The captain said, “Try maybe to sleep twenty minutes when he comes back or before if you want.” Bonin turned down the offer. “Oh … that’s kind” he said. “For the moment I don’t feel like it, but if I do feel like it, yeah.”
    One might tend to conclude that Bonin clearly said he was not tired. After all, they had only pushed back three hours earlier. But the captain follows up with, “it’ll be a lot for you.” Thus apparently knowing and trying to convince Bonin that he had already had a long day and was probably not well rested.
    As the flight progressed toward a line of thunderstorms in the intertropical convergence zone, clear thinking, their skills as pilots, and their understanding of the A330 would soon be required.
    Rest Breaks
    The question is often asked, why was the captain taking a break then?
    For long flights, additional crew members are provided so that no pilot is on flight duty for more than 8 hours. This was the case with AF447, where the flight time was scheduled at 12 hours 45 min. There were two first officers, each fully qualified to act as the pilot in command in the captain’s absence. Obviously, the captain did not suspect that the first officers would become overwhelmed and crash the plane within minutes of his departure.
    While qualifications and experience among pilots vary, it is a false assumption to assume that the captain is always the most qualified or experienced. All pilots go through the same certification course on the airplane, and captains and first officers are trained together.
    It is not uncommon for a first officer to have more experience on a particular plane than the captain. In fact, that was the case with AF447. First Officer David Robert, who would replace the captain in the left seat when the captain went on break, had 4479 hours in the A330, over 2.5 times as much as the captain, though slightly more than half as much total fight time.
    Pierre-Cédric Bonin, the pilot flying in the right seat, at 32 years old was 5 years younger than Robert, and 26 years younger than Captain Dubois. He had 2936 total flight hours and 807 hours on the A330 with a type rating issued six months before the accident. All three pilots had flown the A320 prior to the A330 & A340 for several years, so Airbus flight controls and handling were nothing new to any of them. In fact, their A330 & A340 type ratings courses were differences training from the A320 type rating they each held prior to flying the A330 & A340.
    It is often asked, “why was the junior pilot flying the plane?” The fact is that all pilots need to keep their qualifications current (takeoffs and landings) and the actual flying is shared pretty much equally. No pilot would have any business being there if he was not qualified to fly the airplane at any time.
    Prior to the captain going on his rest break, he discussed that First Officer Bonin would be doing the landing, and thus was to be the pilot flying at that point. According to Air France procedures at the time, because he was the pilot flying in the right seat, he would assume command in the captain’s absence.
    At a press conference on July 29, 2011, the BEA presented the 3rd interim report. It was asked, “You said that the captain had not clearly defined the task-sharing when leaving the cockpit. Did he hand over command of the airplane to the pilot in