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R.A.F. Regiment. Moreover they were even now examining the possibility both of reducing personnel and attaining greater flexibility by reorganising the Armoured Formations, eliminating a high proportion of old-type Artillery Units as atomic cannon became available, reducing the size of Divisions, and relieving Battalions of their heavier types of weapon.
    The foregoing led to a statement that only by increased mobility could the Armies of the Allies hope to hold the greatly superior Land Forces of their potential enemies, and that the real key to the rapid movement of fighting units lay in an unstinted allocation of aircraft, particularly helicopters. Several other types of aircraft were then enumerated and it was insisted that, to obtain maximum efficiency, the pilots of these should obviously be integrated in the Army units concerned, as had been the glider pilots of the Airborne Divisions in the last war.
    This proposed foray into the territory of the airmen was promptly followed by another. Attention was drawn to the fact that all the major German victories during the early days of the last World War were in large part due to the Luftwaffe’s having been subject to the orders of the Generals, which had enabled them to utilise it with maximum effect. As far as our own Army was concerned the creation in the latter stages of the war of Tactical Air Forces, to operate in close co-operation with our ground forces, had been a most valuable innovation. But it was not the proper answer. For any Army in the Field to operate to the best advantage it was requisite that its Tactical Air Force should be just as much an integral part of it as its Artillery, Engineers or Supply train; as there could then never be any difference of opinion between Air and Land Commanders as to its employment or—its diversion to assist in Air operations elsewhere at, perhaps, a critical time for the Land Force to which it was nominally attached.
    It had recently been accepted that in a thermo-nuclear war Land Forces must not expect air cover. That, of course, was on the assumption that such a war would be over very quickly. But, as stated previously, in order to hold the enemy at all great mobility would be required. This could be achieved only by air transport, and that, in turn, would render a combat Air Force essential for its protection. It should also be remembered that the close cooperation of aircraft with land forces was still required for local wars, and the suppression of organised terrorist activities in our dependencies. Under both heads it was therefore recommended that an Army Air Corps should be formed forthwith, and all suitable types of aircraft henceforth diverted to it.
    Passing then to long-term policy, it was accepted that when nuclear weapons had reached their full development in a major war, practically all old-type armaments would become redundant. Tanks, artillery, warships would all be out-moded, fighter aircraft would be replaced by land to air missiles, and eventually bomber aircraft would be suppressed by long-range rockets.
    But, for the present, in view of the possibility that a war begun with nuclear weapons might have to be finished with orthodox ones, the advisability of making any serious reduction in conventional forces in the immediate future might well be questioned.
    This clever, vigorous paper was so well reasoned that I found it most impressive; and I felt that the Soldiers were on a very strong wicket in their contention that the responsibility for maintaining, or restoring, order in our overseas dependencies fell much more largely on them than on either of the other Services; therefore to the Army the New Look could not be acceptable in its entirety as long as there was liable to be trouble in such places as Kenya, British Honduras, Cyprus, etc.
    The Air Ministry paper was obviously written by men who felt that they had nothing to defend, and had complete confidence in their own Arm. It was actually headed with