The Ka of Gifford Hillary Read Online Free PDF Page B

surrender. The Air Force would, therefore, have to support these Land Forces in order to redress the disparity of numbers, and assist in blocking such breakthroughs as might occur.
    However, it should be borne in mind that, while the Land Forces at present on the Continent were a necessary commitment, it would be pointless to maintain Reserve Divisions in Britain with a view to their reinforcement, or to mobilise others on the outbreak of hostilities, as it would prove impossible to transport any but a limited number of light units to the scene of action in time for them to participate in the battle.
    It was also accepted that the Army must maintain a sufficiency of conventional forces to deal with eventualities arising outside Europe, and that for such operations Air supportwould be required. But this commitment, together with that of supporting our Land Forces in Europe, must now be regarded as a second priority to that of preparing swiftly to win a thermo-nuclear war by the use of Air Power; and no project of diverting aircraft or pilots for any other purpose could be entertained.
    In the future, aircraft production should, with a minimum of necessary exceptions, be devoted to turning out aircraft to win the air war. Only so could the R.A.F. hope to counter the might of the Soviet Air Force; and unless this was agreed neither the Home Country nor our Land Forces on the Continent could hope to survive.
    The paper then passed to the defence of the Kingdom. It said that we must expect nuclear explosives to be directed against our cities both by means of bombers and guided missiles. It was hoped that the latest scientific developments would enable us to explode a large proportion of these in the air, well before they reached their targets. For this purpose both fighter aircraft and missile to missile weapons fired from the ground would be employed. These two methods of defence were now in the process of being co-ordinated and would be controlled by Fighter Command.
    Coastal Command had, like the Navy, become redundant, as in the brief space of a one-week war it could serve no useful purpose.
    Finally, the Airmen went right to the core of the matter. Having courteously deplored the necessity brought about by a new age virtually to disestablish the Royal Navy and reduce the Army, the suggestion was put forward that the time had come to combine all three Services in a Royal Defence Force.
    It was pointed out that Technicians, Gunners. Signallers, Supply, Medical and other specialist Services could all be integrated without difficulty; that two-thirds of the personnel of the Navy were now employed in its twenty Fleet Air Arm Stations and in Aircraft Carriers, so were in fact already Airmen; and that it should be possible to find administrative posts for the majority of officers still on the purely nautical side.
    Finally, it was stated that a nuclear war would be determined neither on the sea nor on the land, but in the air. Therefore the training of personnel to fight in such a war, andthe direction of operations should it come about, must be mainly the province of officers who had qualified for high command by a life-time of service in the R.A.F.
    So that was that. By offering to sink their own identity in a Royal Defence Force, the Airmen had at least proposed a means by which the ‘face’ of the Navy could be saved, and which should prove much more acceptable to the Army than having to surrender its missile-launching sites to Fighter Command.
    I should add that I have mentioned only the salient points in these papers, and having only the ordinary man’s very limited acquaintance with their subjects may even have unwittingly somewhat distorted an opinion here and there. They dealt with many other subjects, including the potentialities of numerous secret weapons of which I had never heard, and their length may be judged by the fact that they took me over an hour and a quarter to read.
    After re-reading a few paragraphs to