The Hunt for bin Laden Read Online Free PDF Page A

Massoud might be a flawed ally, they declared, but bin Laden was by far the greater danger.
    Frightened by swelling intelligence reports warning that al-Qaeda planned new terrorist strikes, Richard Clarke and Clinton’s national security adviser, Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger, approved the JAWBREAKER-5 mission. They were uneasy about Massoud but said they were ready to try anything within reason that might lead to bin Laden’s capture or death.
    Massoud was at war across northern Afghanistan against the Taliban, whose puritan mullahs had allied themselves with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda fighters in a drive to control all Afghan territory and destroy Massoud’s coalition. Massoud’s men often maneuvered in battle against bin Laden’s brigade of Arab volunteers, as well as al-Qaeda-sponsored Pakistani volunteers and Chechen fighters. Ultimately, Cofer Black, heading the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, hoped Massoud would capture bin Laden during one of these engagements and kill him or hand him over for trial.
    In dimly lit Panjshir Valley safe houses in October 1999, Massoud told the JAWBREAKER-5 team that he was willing to deepen his partnership with the CIA, but he was explicit about his limitations. Bin Laden spent most of his time near the southern city of Kandahar, in the eastern Afghan mountains, far from where Massoud’s forces operated. Occasionally, bin Laden visited Jalalabad or Kabul, closer to the Northern Alliance’s lines. In these areas, Massoud’s intelligence service had active agents, and perhaps they could develop more sources.
    Massoud also told the CIA delegation that U.S. policy toward bin Laden and Afghanistan was doomed to fail. The Americans directed all of their efforts against bin Laden and a handful of his senior aides, but they failed to see the larger context in which al-Qaeda thrived. What about the Taliban? What about the Taliban’s supporters in Pakistani intelligence? What about its financiers in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?
    “Even if we succeed in what you are asking for,” Massoud told the CIA delegation, his aide and interpreter Abdullah recalled, “that will not solve the bigger problem that is growing.”
    The CIA officers told Massoud that they agreed with his critique, but they had their orders. The U.S. government rejected a military confrontation with the Taliban or direct support for any armed factions in the broader Afghan war. Instead, U.S. policy focused on capturing bin Laden and his lieutenants for criminal trial or killing them in the course of an arrest attempt. If Massoud helped with this narrow mission, the CIA officers argued, perhaps it would lead to wider political support or development aid in the future.
    “What was irritating was that in this whole tragedy, in this whole chaotic situation,” recalled one of Massoud’s intelligence aides who worked closely with the CIA during this period, “they were talking about this very small piece of it: bin Laden. And if you were on our side, it would have been very difficult for you to accept that this was the problem. For us, it was an element of the problem but not the problem.”
    Still, Massoud and his aides agreed that they had nothing to lose by helping the CIA. “First of all, it was an effort against a common enemy,” recalled Abdullah. “Second, we had the hope that it would get the U.S. to know better about the situation in Afghanistan.”

 
    Doubts About Massoud
    Massoud had a long, checkered history with the CIA. Among those with the proper security clearances, the accusations and stories of perfidy had become legend.
    The CIA first sent Massoud aid in 1984. But their relations were undermined by the CIA’s heavy dependence on Pakistan during the war against the Soviets. The Pakistani intelligence service despised Massoud because he had waged a long and brutal campaign against Pakistan’s main Islamic radical client, the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. As the war against the Soviets