Target: Rabaul Read Online Free PDF Page B

this, Roosevelt replied: “I’ll be watching [for] the results.”
    Kenney undoubtedly felt immense satisfaction after his second meeting with the president, but the following day brought unsettling news from Arnold. Ten thousand miles away, the man who had replaced Walker had gone missing. After climbing aboard a B-17 at Port Moresby for a reconnaissance flight on the morning of March 26, Brig. Gen. Howard K. Ramey and his crew had vanished. That it happened on the same day as Walker’s posthumous ceremony (it was still March 25 in Washington) was downright bizarre. “Ramey’s loss a bad one,” Kenney wrote that night. “Bomber command needs a good steady hand to keep their heads up and morale high. Their losses are higher than any other outfit, and when a plane goes down it takes a big crew with it.”
    The next day, Kenney requested Col. John H. “Big Jim” Davies, an old hand in New Guinea and a former commander of the 3rd Bomb Group, as Ramey’s replacement. He then wired Brigadier General Whitehead, who commanded the Advanced Echelon (ADVON) at Port Morseby, and instructed him to take over V Bomber Command for the interim.
    Ramey’s disappearance clouded what had otherwise been a highly successful trip. Kenney had visited twice with President Roosevelt and was featured on the oversize cover of Life magazine. For a short time, he was a celebrity. But those were niceties. Kenney had traveled to Washington for one reason: to obtain more airplanes, personnel, and the other assets necessary to fight the Japanese. The outcome of the conference, thanks to the president’s influence, had exceeded Kenney’s expectations. Of at least equal importance, he had improved his standing with the head of the army air forces, Hap Arnold.
    In the months and years to come, the benefits of the long trip to Washington would help Kenney win the air war in his far-flung corner of the Pacific.

CHAPTER 2

Steppingstones: The Elkton Plan
    W HILE KENNEY WORKED on obtaining planes and personnel, Sutherland was responsible for presenting MacArthur’s strategic plans for the coming year to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The stakes were high, but Sutherland enjoyed MacArthur’s absolute confidence, was authorized to open and read all his incoming mail and messages (even those marked “Eyes Only”), and answered most of them in MacArthur’s stead. For all practical purposes, Sutherland was MacArthur, or at least his alter ego in GHQ—an arrangement that served both men equally. As far as the Joint Chiefs were concerned, Sutherland’s presence at the conference carried the same weight as if MacArthur himself were there.
    The strategic plans that Sutherland would present on behalf of GHQ could be traced back some thirteen months. In January 1942, mere weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral King had begun pressing for a counteroffensive in the Pacific theater. King’s persistence eventually got results. On February 1, two carrier groups were sent from Hawaii to attack Japanese facilities in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Although the raids caused little material damage, they embarrassed Imperial General Headquarters. Shortly thereafter, King authorized a third task force to venture deep into enemy waters for a strike against Rabaul. That effort, scheduled for the morning of February 21, was called off after Japanese flying boats discovered USS Lexington and Task Force 11 four hundred miles from Rabaul.
    Another opportunity to hurt the Japanese arose a few weeks later, resulting in a highly successful strike by the combined air groups of Lexington and Yorktown . On the morning of March 10, the aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley Mountains and surprised a Japanese invasion fleet at Lae, sinking three big transports and damaging several warships. In addition to giving the home front a much-needed morale boost, the attack caused Tokyo more embarrassment.
    One key to the raid’s success was an intelligence breakthrough. Partial