Sergeant Gander Read Online Free PDF Page A

sleep on the floor beside his bed.
    Gander appeared to be well aware of his importance in the regiment. Explains George MacDonell, “He was soon promoted to sergeant and wore his red stripes on a black leather harness with the regimental badge. He proudly strutted at the head of the band on church parades and … refused all other canines entry to the barracks.” 3
    In May 1941, the Royal Rifles were transferred to St. John’s, Newfoundland, to perform garrison duty and receive further training. By September 1941, the Royal Rifles had been moved back to Canada, and were stationed at Saint John, New Brunswick. At that point, the director of military training, Colonel John Lawson, identified the Royal Rifles as “insufficiently trained and not recommended for operations.” 4 Despite his observation, a month later the Royal Rifles received their orders to prepare for overseas duty. Although their destination was unknown, the decision had been made that the Royal Rifles, along with the Winnipeg Grenadiers, would be sent to Hong Kong to help reinforce the British garrison against Japanese attack. The British had been hoping that the combination of Japan’s military commitments in China, their fear of antagonizing the United States, and the threat of an attack by Soviet Russia on their northern borders, might deter Japan from attacking Britain’s Asian colonies. However, when Japan signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941, the British recognized the increased threat to their holdings in Asia. With Great Britain tied down defending their homeland from German attack, they needed all the help they could get to protect their colonies in other parts of the world.
    The decision to reinforce the defences of Hong Kong was a contentious one. Both the British chiefs of staff and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill opposed any further strengthening of the colony. In August 1940, the chiefs of staff stated:
    Hong Kong is not a vital interest and the garrison could not
withstand Japanese attack … Even if we had a strong fleet in the
Far East, it is doubtful that Hong Kong could be held now that
the Japanese are firmly established on the mainland of China …
In the event of war, Hong Kong must be regarded as an outpost
and held as long as possible. We should resist the inevitably strong
pressure to reinforce Hong Kong and we should certainly be
unable to relieve it. 5
    This sentiment was echoed by Churchill at the beginning of 1941, when he stated, “If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolic scale … We must avoid frittering away our resources on untenable positions. Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any of them would be noticeable and dangerous.” 6
    Yet there was a faction, including Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Rear Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, and Major-General A.E. Grasett (commander of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force), who believed that Hong Kong should be held. Grasett’s appeal to the British War Office, suggesting that the Canadians might be willing to assist in the reinforcement of Hong Kong, found some receptive ears and in September 1941, a cable was sent to Ottawa, proposing that,
    A small re-enforcement of the garrison of Hong Kong, e.g. by one
or two battalions, would be very fully justified. It would increase
the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the actual
numbers involved and it would provide a very strong stimulus to
the garrison and to the Colony, it would further have a great moral
effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang
Kai Shek