Riding the Red Horse Read Online Free PDF Page B

war,’ tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat ‘civilized’ so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th-century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. The ‘football mentality’ we have developed since World War II works against us.’”
    In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of Fourth Generation war and those of the Brave New World. Fourth Generation forces understand this, while the international elites that seek the Brave New World do not. The minutes read, “Osama bin-Laden, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security, but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate, both physically and psychologically, Fourth Generation war leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their followers.
    This contrasts dramatically with the Brave New World elites who are physically and psychologically separated from their followers by a huge gap. Even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men. The Brave New World elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don’t know it.”
    In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians were in many ways more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?
    How would the Mafia do an occupation? When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what it does best; for example, having the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, and the Italians the occupation? How could the U.S. Department of Defense’s concept of Transformation be redefined to come to grips with Fourth Generation war? If you read the current Transformation Planning Guidance put out by the department, you will find nothing on Fourth Generation war, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting; it is oriented toward fighting state armed forces that fight us symmetrically. [4]
    We asked, “Will Saddam’s capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq?” The conclusion? Don’t count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam’s capture might lead to a fracturing of the Ba’ath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can re-create the state. It might also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.
    However, if the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I do not think we will be that smart.
     
    “Getting It”
     
    When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems no one in the U.S. military gets it. Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to USMC General James Mattis, commander, 1st Marine Division, asking for his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of making time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools: “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flatfooted by any situation. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.” [5]
    Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation war. He said,