Riding the Red Horse Read Online Free PDF

facing the U.S. Armed Forces, and no one else seemed to be.
    Group members recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task might be hopeless; state militaries might not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do. But for what they are worth, here are some of our thoughts.
     
    Points to Ponder
     
    If America had some Third Generation ground forces capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away, suffering few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy can, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire), and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that USMC infantry today has a sustained march rate of 10 to 15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.
    Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but some might be open to a chivalric code governing how war with them would be fought. This is worth exploring. How U.S forces conduct themselves after the battle might be as important in Fourth Generation war as how they fight the battle. What the USMC calls cultural intelligence is of vital importance in Fourth Generation war, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seem to be grasping this much better than the U.S. Army.
    What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces (SOF)? We think minds are more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this. One key to success is integrating troops as much as possible with the local people. Unfortunately, the U.S. doctrine of force protection works against integration and generally hurts us badly. A quote from the minutes of one of our meetings says, “There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.”
    What wins at the tactical and physical levels might lose at the operational, strategic, mental, and moral levels, where Fourth Generation war is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. [3] This is something the Second Generation U.S. military has great trouble grasping because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates. We must recognize that in Fourth Generation war, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.
    What can the U.S. military learn from police officers? U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops. Are we taking advantage of what they know?
    One key to success in Fourth Generation war might be “losing to win.” Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is difficult to recreate it. Another quote from the minutes says, “While war against another state may be necessary, one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the ‘honors of