political
12
Reinterpreting the French Revolution
evolution, which in this closing phase of the Revolution expressed itself
primarily as a polarization and “militarization” of politics leading directly
to the Bonapartist coup of November 1799.
A Conclusion, after briefly restating the central thesis of the study and
summarizing the conclusions to be derived from it, will situate the entire
revolutionary experience in a broader historical context, with reference to
the longue durée of early modern, modern, and “contemporary” French
(and world) history.
The argument, as outlined above, will “play” the French Revolution as
tragedy – but tragedy with a certain ironic twist. At one level, it is easy
to view the whole revolutionary experience as demonstrating the relent-
less durability of expedience – the expedience of “bourgeois” class inter-
ests, to be sure, but, equally, of French anxieties about and aspirations in
Europe – and the ultimate fragility of more altruistic concerns. Whatever
some historians may have written, the Revolution was not suddenly and
fortuitously blown off course as the French turned to massive warfare dur-
ing the 1790s.28 In one fashion or another, war inhered in the Revolution
from the start, and even before the start: in its causation as well as in its
course and its aftermath. The sanguinary Terror of 1793–94 was, in hind-
sight, implicit not so much in the rhetoric and ideology of the times as in
the paramount need of this proud nation to prevail, by whatever desperate
means, in the sullied, scarred European world of the late eighteenth cen-
tury. No faction of politicians could escape from this compelling reality,
a reality that from one year to the next came to acquire precedence over
all other realities. Whatever the revolutionaries might strive to do for their
constituents (and, as we have already noted, our analytical approach obliges
us to take account of those ameliorative efforts), they were forced in the
end to tailor their dreams and their reforms to statist exigencies even more,
perhaps, than to their sense of immediate “class” interest.
At a deeper level of perception, however, the sense of tragedy yields to
irony – the irony in the fact that, to one extent or another, all persons in the new polity struggling to establish itself had a stake in the restoration
of France’s stature in the world, whether or not they were aware of this. It
may be true that those on the fringes, or beyond the pale, of “civilized” and
domiciled society were in fact as indifferent to the Revolution in general as
their chronicler Richard Cobb has suggested in many studies.29 Moreover,
28 An argument put forth by, among others, Franc¸ois Furet and Denis Richet in The French Revolution , trans. Stephen Hardman (New York: Macmillan, 1970), esp. chap. 5.
29 See, for example: Richard Cobb, The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789–1820 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Reactions to the French Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); and Paris and Its Provinces, 1792–1802
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
Introduction
13
the Revolution insofar as it was a Parisian phenomenon undeniably
violated at times the sensibilities (and the material interests) of those in the
provinces.30 Yet again, it is all too obvious that it categorically withheld its
most meaningful opportunities, and many of its benefits, from women.31
Still, even these unfortunates were shielded by the Revolution’s military
successes from the worst depredations of Europe’s other armies (though,
on occasion, they were harassed and oppressed by their own troops), and in
some instances they genuinely profited from social and economic reforms
enacted in this era. As for those adult males definitely sporting the new
citizenship, they certainly stood to gain in more concrete ways from
innovations that afforded them new
Fletcher Pratt, L. Sprague deCamp
Connie Brockway, Eloisa James Julia Quinn