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minds of its people are the property of the state.
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    For the past third of a century, when we in the West have thought about World War III, the term has conjured up dreadful visions of a nuclear Armageddon. But while the West casually refers to the absence of nuclear war as peace, the Soviets have assiduously been fighting “a war called peace,” trying to win World War III without risking a nuclear exchange. They know that the object of war is not to obliterate the opponent, but to make him surrender. As the Prussian military strategist Clausewitz observed long ago, the aggressor never wants war; he would prefer to enter your country unopposed.
    If we study Soviet actions, they show a clear pattern: not necessarily a “master plan” or a predictable timetable for world conquest, but rather a constant strengthening of military forces and a consistent exploitation of every opportunity to expand their own power and to weaken that of the West. Just as water flows downhill, the Soviets press to extend their power wherever it can reach, by whatever means they calculate can be effective. They are totally amoral opportunists. They will carefully calculate cost-benefit ratios, but they will not fret over the sanctity of contracts, the value of human life, or “bourgeois” concepts of justice.
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    Apologists often argue that the Soviets are really trying to ensure their own security against what they perceive as real or potential threats from abroad, and that once they have sufficient strength to ensure that security, their appetites will be sated. There may be some truth to the first half of that argument, but the trouble with the second half is that the Russian appetite for “security” is insatiable. The more the Soviets acquire, the more they have to protect; and they define “security” only as domination, whether at home or abroad. They have no tradition of compromise, of accommodation, of consensus, or indeed of a rule of law. As long as there is one country or one person who might stand in opposition, they consider their securityin jeopardy. To them, security, like power, can only be total. And so it can only be guaranteed by total elimination of all potential opposition. In the Soviet view, Russian gains in security must come from the losses of others; there is no increase in mutual security. For the Soviets to be secure, in their view, others must be rendered insecure.
    The Soviet leadership has no concept of “peace” as we understand it, or of coexistence as we would define it. They do not believe in the concept of equals. An equal is, by their definition, a rival, to be eliminated before he eliminates you.
    The Soviet goal is, reversing Woodrow Wilson, a world made unsafe for democracy: a world in which the Soviet state is secure and all others respect Soviet control and pay Soviet tribute. The Soviet ambition has been appropriately described as a desire for“the capability to control global economic, political, and strategic affairs directly from Moscow.” The Chinese communists accuse the Soviets of seeking “hegemony,” and the word aptly describes Soviet aims.
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    The meaning of World War III is written starkly and eloquently on the faces of the boat people of Vietnam, who desperately risk death on the high seas, and rejection when they finally reach land, rather than continue to live in the prison that was once their country. Millions from other countries have risked all in their efforts to escape communism, or have abandoned homes, possessions, even families, in sad pilgrimages as their countries were partitioned. As villagers flee the advancing lava from a volcano, these new dispossessed flee the advance of a tyranny that calls itself “liberation.”
    Before the communist regime took power in mainland China, Hong Kong was a city of little more