Pirates of Somalia Read Online Free PDF Page A

the hijacked ship. Puntland security forces, waiting on shore to arrest the brigands, could only watch as US Navy helicopters escorted the pirate skiffs to land and allowed the pirates to disembark. I asked Boyah why the Americans had let them escape once they had left the safety of their hostages on board the Nori .
    “Because that was the agreement,” Boyah said. But I already knew the real reason, at least from the US point of view: the Americans would not have known what to do with Boyah and his men if they had captured them. According to international law—to the extent that international law has any meaning in an utterly failed state—the Americans were not even supposed to be in Somali territorial waters. Their hands were tied, and they let the pirates go.
    The Golden Nori was one of the first major commercial vessels hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, before the international community had truly become cognizant of the problem. During this period, foreign navies tended to give pirates a slap on the wrist: their weapons and boats were impounded or destroyed, and they were released. More recently, states have begun to use the international legal instruments available to them—particularly a UN Security Council resolution permitting foreign entry into Somali waters—much more rigorously. Foreign warships are increasingly interdicting, detaining, and rendering suspected pirates to neighbouring countries to face justice.
    Boyah had experienced this approach as well. In April 2008, his gang seized a rare prize, a speedy French luxury yacht on route from the Seychelles to the Mediterranean. Boyah called it the “Libant,” a clumsy fusion of the ship’s French name, Le Ponant . After delivering a ransom and freeing the hostages, French attack helicopters tracked the pirates inland to the village of Jariban. On the executive orders of President Nicolas Sarkozy, French commandos launched Operation Thalathine: special forces snipers disabled the pirates’ getaway vehicle and captured six of the brigands, subsequently flying them to Paris to face trial. Such a determined, and exceedingly costly, pursuit was a rarity. But the incident illustrated that the international community was starting to take piracy in the Gulf of Aden more seriously—as well as showcasing the touchiness of French pride.
    But a military solution alone is incapable of completely eradicating piracy off the Somali coast—nor is one either economically or politically feasible. Boyah’s men had been captured or killed with increasing frequency in recent days (his brother was sitting in a Bossaso prison), but it did not matter. Imprisoning them was like trying to use a bailer to drain the ocean: for each pirate captured by the authorities, there were dozens of desperate young men on shore ready to rush in and fill the void.
    At its very core, the solution to piracy lies in basic economic principles: the cost-benefit analysis for these men must be shifted to favour more legitimate pursuits. Naval battle fleets can do their part to boost the “cost” side of piracy, but without the alternative “benefit” of meaningful occupations on land, no permanent resolution is possible.
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    Boyah had become visibly irritable, and the next pause in my questioning heralded the end of the interview. His bothersome task completed, he rose and started heading back to where the vehicles were parked. As he walked, Warsame casually sidled up to Boyah and slipped him a folded hundred-dollar bill; suddenly the puzzling incongruity between Boyah’s irascible manner and his willingness to speak to me was perfectly clear. “These pirates always need money, you know, to buy khat,” said Warsame, referring to the stimulant drug religiously consumed by pirates. “Always, they chew khat.”
    Meanwhile, Boyah had once more leaked out ahead of the rest of us, bounding up the trail alone. Warsame and I gaped as he suddenly took off and effortlessly cleared the metre-wide