the power to send their economy into a deep depression if we were ever to withdraw our holdings and dump the dollars we hold.”
“We have that leverage indeed, Mr. Chairman, but I doubt many Americans know this. It’s one of their government’s dirty little secrets.” He said this with regret as he fondly remembered the many years he lived in America as a student at Stanford.
“I would also remind the PSC,” Lin said, “that in a geopolitical sense, China has outflanked America in sewing up new markets and developing partnerships. Our Shanghai Cooperative Organization partners, the side arrangements we have with Iran and Iraq, our African partnerships, and our joint ventures with Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela have all helped to strengthen our access to oil and resources for years to come. These nations have become our trade partners because it is easier to do business with us than with the Americans, who place political preconditions on them for human rights, environmental, and other concerns. Our partners also like the air cover we can provide them against unwanted sanctions by virtue of our permanent membership and veto power in the UN Security Council. Our formula with trade partners, I would remind the PSC, is simple: we invest in their infrastructure, make deals, get their raw resources, and then manufacture and ship back to them finished goods and military equipment. Our factories are running and our population has jobs. Why would we want to disrupt this winning formula with a needless war?”
Wang smiled in appreciation. “It’s a winning formula indeed, Mr. Chairman, but one that can be easily disrupted by wars and other destabilizing geopolitical events. Will the PSC see this as they consider actions against Japan, or will they insist on a military solution that will surely cause Japan to call on the United States in a conflict against China?”
“I wish I knew,” the pensive chairman replied. “My greatest concern is that Japan will bring the United States into the conflict by virtue of their once-close security alliance. Militarily, Japan is insignificant. The Americans are still powerful, though the Seventh Fleet is not what it used to be. In a conventional war with America there would be a standoff; in a nuclear war, we are all destroyed. We are making great progress with the expansion of our blue-water navy to safeguard our sea lanes with international trade partners and to extend our naval power beyond the China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. I’d hate to see all this risked in a premature confrontation with the United States.”
Wang nodded, in full agreement with the chairman’s assessments.
“When all is said and done, Peng, the dragon in the chicken coop is still King Oil. Saudi Arabia and its OPEC partners still hold all the cards. The Saudis are one of our major suppliers of oil, but in all honesty I couldn’t tell you for sure what side they would take if it came to war with the United States over Chunxiao. Have you read any of the latest intelligence reports from that area, by the way?”
“Yes I have, and they are disturbing. Hard to say how accurate they are, but it would appear that the royal Saudi government has become increasingly unpopular with powerful segments of the hard-line Islamic fundamentalists and average citizens who see little benefit from oil revenues. It bears careful watching. A destabilized Middle East is certainly something this world can’t abide.”
Lin nodded in agreement and seemed lost for a moment in some troubling thought before he continued.
“Our challenge today with the PSC, Peng, will be to convince them that it makes no sense to engage Japan—or worse, the United States—in a military confrontation at this time. They will be boiling mad and eager to attack, but it is a wise man who knows when to fight and when not to. We will seek recompense from the Japanese for the loss of the Dragon II via the United Nations and do the usual diplomatic