action. The figure of speech that âthe time of greatest danger of attack is two years henceâ disappeared from JCS papers. Military intelligence officers and civilian analysts became more sophisticated, their language more moderate, their descriptions of the Communist threat more accurate and less scary.
The commanderâs estimate, Cline summarized, along with others in the following years, âsucceeded in reducing the Soviet military threat to the United States to reasonable proportions in the minds of war-planning staffs.â This in turn allowed Ike to hold steady to his âNew Lookâ in defense policy, at an immense financial savings to the nation while simultaneously reducing fears and slowing the arms race. The CIA , Cline boasts, âprobably never accomplished more of value to the nation than this quiet, little-remarked analytical feat.â 4
Clineâs accomplishment was a victory for analysis. It was matched by the CIAâS greatest triumph of intelligence gathering, the U-2 program, discussed in the following chapter. A third function of the DDIâS side of the CIA was prediction, to anticipate events around the world and report them to the President before they happened. Even when the President could not do anything one way or another about the event, which was usually the case, he always wanted to know in advance. American Presidents hate to be caught bysurprise. It is the CIAâS job to tell the President what is going to happen, and it is an almost impossible assignment.
IN 1956, ON THE EVE of the Eisenhower vs. Stevenson presidential election, France and Britain joined with Israel to attack Egypt. White House Press Secretary James Hagerty told reporters that the President got his first information on the invasion âthrough press reports.â The attack âcame as a complete surprise to us.â Simultaneously, the Russians sent their tanks into the streets of Budapest; Administration spokesmen told the press that the Russian attack on Hungary was also a complete surprise.
Such reports made Allen Dulles furious. A month later he leaked stories to the Washington press corps that the CIA had predicted Hungary in detail. He also complained to reporter Andrew Tully, âMy brother said the State Department was taken by surprise. That was only technically correct. What he meant was that the British, French and Israeli governments had not informed our ambassadors. But we had the Suez operation perfectly taped. We reported that there would be a three-nation attack on Suez. And on the day before the invasion CIA reported it was
imminent
.â 5
Dullesâ leaks made Ike, in his turn, furious. The President had a legendary temper, which he struggledâusually successfullyâall his life to control. When angry, he could not keep the bright red color out of his face, and the back of his neck would become red as a beet, but he did manage to sit perfectly still. Under his desk, however, he would tear his handkerchief into tiny bits, down to the individual strands of cotton. When he finished, there would be a loose ball of cotton strands at his feet, and no handkerchief.
What upset Ike was, first, the fact of the leak itselfâall Presidents dislike leaks. Second, Dullesâ claims to have predicted Suez and Hungary simply were not true. But the ultimate insult to Ike was Dullesâ hint that the President was too lazy to do his homework. Throughout his presidency, Ike smarted under the criticism that he took too many vacations, that he did not work hard enough, that he neglected his duties for a golf game or a fishing expedition, and most of all that he refused to read any report that was more than one page long.
In an April 1958 article on Hungary,
Harperâs Magazine
repeated Dullesâ charges that Ike would have known what wasgoing to happen if he had only read the CIA reports. Eisenhower, according to
Harperâs
, âshowed great
Carmen Caine, Madison Adler