Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 Read Online Free PDF Page A

provoking war, at least on subjecting the United States to a diplomatic humiliation that would not only reduce American prestige in the Far East to zero, but at the same time force that country to acknowledge, in so many words, Japan’s complete ascendency in China and her monopoly of Chinese resources. The gravity of the issue was fully appreciated at Washington, but the authorities were determined to prevent the catastrophe of war if this were possible without the sacrifice of national honour. In a long and courteously worded Note the Japanese Government was urged to reconsider the arbitration proposal, and assured that the United States would scrupulously refrain from taking any action, military or otherwise, that could in any way be construed as prejudicial to Japanese interests. The Sayers concession, as well as all other American undertakings in the disputed Chinese territory, would be regarded as in abeyance pending the decision of the arbitration court. The Note concluded by recalling the traditional friendship between the two nations, “which the United States Government most earnestly desires shall continue unimpaired, and which it will do its utmost to preserve.”
    But forces were already at work against which all the arts of diplomacy were powerless. Japan, having definitely resolved to unsheath the sword, was in no mood to draw back at the eleventh hour. Her reply to the last American Note was curt, and while professing peaceful sentiments, reiterated the demand that no reinforcements of any kind, whether of ships, troops, or material, should be dispatched to the American stations west of Hawaii. “The Imperial Government,” added Baron Fukuhara, “assumes that the transports already en route to Manila will be ordered back immediately; failing which it must reserve the right to take such measures as may be expedient in the interest of national defence.”
    There were some members of the Cabinet at Washington who would have yielded to this ultimatum — for such in effect it was — rather than involve their country in war; but by this time public opinion was taking a hand in the matter. Devotion to peace is inherent in the American temperament; but so also is a passionate patriotism, which at moments of national crisis is apt to override every other consideration. If in this instance the Japanese demands had contained the smallest element of justice or equity, had they even been presented in a less bellicose manner, public opinion in the United States would have been unconquerably opposed to war, and the Government might have made almost any sacrifice of interests in the Far East without incurring the anger of its people. As it was, however, Japan’s truculence had the desired effect. The State Department’s last Note to Tokyo was condemned in nearly all quarters as being far too mildly worded, the Press with few exceptions urging the Government to inform Japan in plain terms that the limit of American patience had been reached. More than this, it demanded that all requisite steps be taken without delay to protect American interests in Asia. Special emphasis was laid on the necessity of putting the Philippines into a state of defence.
    Confronted with this evidence of the nation’s resolve to defend its rights at all costs, the Government had no option but to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Japan. This it did by notifying Tokyo that the latter’s demand for the recall of the transports en route to Manila could not be entertained. At this date, February 28, the ships in question, Beaufort and Newport News , were half-way across the Pacific, and destroyers of the United States Asiatic fleet had been ordered to meet them at a point one thousand miles east of Manila, to convoy them safely over the last stage of their journey. Concurrently with this Note to Japan, Admiral Ribley, commanding the Asiatic Fleet, was instructed to assemble all units of his command at Cavite, the principal naval base in the