The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919 Read Online Free PDF Page A

August, the German high command was putting the best face on a bad situation. Moltke told the government in Berlin that a demonstration of Alliance unity mattered more than Italy’s material contribution. A token force would be enough. Yet Berlin would not lean on Rome, judging that it would be counterproductive unless the Austrians made a positive gesture. The Austrians still deluded themselves that resolute action against Serbia would bring Italy to heel. Italy wanted Austria’s promise of ‘compensation’ before it would consider supporting the Central Powers, while Austria wanted proof of support before it would consider giving any territory – and even then, the south Tyrol was out of the question.
    By this point, Italian forces were concentrating towards the French border in accordance with Pollio’s plans. On 31 July, Cadorna sent the King a memorandum on the deployment towards France and ‘the transport of the largest possible force to Germany’. Meanwhile San Giuliano told the cabinet that, in present conditions, Italy could not fight. No one told the King, who approved Cadorna’s memo the following day. By now the Austrians knew they had sparked a European war, and they told the Italians that they could expect compensation if they supported their allies. Conrad cabled Cadorna to ask how he intended to co-operate. Too late! It was 1 August, and the wider conflict had begun. Next day, without even informing Cadorna, the government declared neutrality. It was five days after Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, two days after Russia mobilised, and one day after Germany declared war on Russia.
    When he heard the news, Cadorna went to Salandra, who confirmed that fighting France was out of the question. ‘So what should I do?’ the Chief of Staff asked. Salandra said nothing. ‘Prepare for war against Austria?’ ventured Cadorna.
    ‘That’s right,’ said the Prime Minister.
    Cadorna began a massive re-deployment to the north-east. The switch had to remain low-key, or the Austrians might lash out preemptively – or so Salandra claimed to fear, even though Austria’s border with Italy was practically undefended and the Austrians were in no position to divert forces from Serbia and Galicia.
    San Giuliano’s case for not joining Austria and Germany was solid. Apart from the matter of compensation, the Alliance was a defensive treaty and Austria was the aggressor against Serbia. (Austria’s 23 July ultimatum was, he said grandly, ‘incompatible with the liberal principles of our public law’.) Moreover, Austria and Germany had violated the Alliance by excluding Italy from their discussions. These objections could have been finessed if the public had roared support for the Triple Alliance, but opinion was broadly anti-Austrian. The government and industry feared the effects of a British naval blockade if Italy joined the Central Powers. Italy depended on Britain and France for raw materials and foodstuffs, and almost all of Italy’s coal arrived with other imports through routes controlled by the British navy.
    For these reasons, and out of respect for British military power, as well as a feeling that Britain’s position on the sidelines during July was like Italy’s own, the Italians wanted to see which way London would jump. Britain’s entry into the war on 4 August calmed those senior figures who had wondered if it was rash not to support the Central Powers. Looking further ahead, the government feared that whether or not the Powers defeated the Allies, Italy was unlikely to get what it wanted. San Giuliano summed up the conundrum: if Austria fails to win convincingly, it will not be able to compensate us, and, if it does win, it will have no motive to do so. The best course was to wait and watch.
    Germany urged Austria to offer enough territory to swing the Italians on-side, or at least stop them joining the enemy. Any concession could be revoked after victory. With late-imperial arrogance,