The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush Read Online Free PDF

before decisions are made (Waterman 1989, 185-86).
While confrontation can be an effective tactic, prudent exercise of the administrative tools can best be of use to presidents if they understand the limits of their power and are careful not to invite unintended or poorly planned confrontation. These tools can also be used in tandem, as, for example, when loyal appointees support Office of Management and Budget (OMB)-mandated budget reductions in their own agencies, in which case, surrogates, central clearance, and budget control are all utilized.
The improvident use of these tools, however, can weaken the presidency more than strengthen it. These tools are also based on the questionable assumption that presidents can control the bureaucracy, an assumption that may not give sufficient credit to the tenacity of the

 

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bureaucracy itself, the dynamism of the political system, and the other major player in that system, the Congress. Congress initially delegates many of the tools to the president through confirmation of appointees, enactment of enabling legislation, and appropriation of operating budget, and so shares authority over their use. Other key players in this policy drama are the courts, the cabinet, the PASs, the career bureaucrats, the media, the general public, and interest groups (ibid.).
Because presidents' power is so widely shared, confrontation is a tactic best used sparingly; theirs is the power to persuade more than to command. Presidents must adopt a political approach, even within their own bureaucracy. They "must bargain and compromise. . . . This is so because presidents share authority with their subordinates within the Executive Branch; they do not control them. The best way is to work with the bureaucracy and not against it" (ibid., 169-70).
Presidents can strengthen their hand through clarity of presidential intent and the appointment of competent loyalists, clear transmittal of presidential orders to the agencies, and personal presidential interest and involvement in key issues and areas. Other means are lines of authority that give subordinates the power to accomplish presidential policy desires, respect for the power of other policy actors in the field, and care not to overstep presidential bounds (ibid., 190-92).
Any of these tactics, no matter how ably applied, can backfire unexpectedly in what Pfiffner calls the "central paradoxes" of the managerial or administrative presidency. For example, while one administrative strategy is to flood the bureaucracy with loyal supporters, that strategy can have unintended consequences and dangers; the greatest threats to the reputations and political interests of recent presidents have come from "over-enthusiastic loyalists [seeking to do their boss's will regardless of the consequences] rather than from political 'enemies"' (Pfiffner 1991, 4).
The Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages deal is a case in point. As this convoluted tale slowly unwound, White House aides Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Robert McFarlane claimed to have acted independently of presidential directive. However, their close association with the president meant that, even though they fell on their swords for their leader, as loyal aides are expected to do, they could in no way shield President Reagan and then-Vice President Bush from at least indirect responsibility for the scandal. 3
While the president should designate a chief of staff to handle routine matters, he himself "must be involved sufficiently to ensure that his interests are being well served. The president must probe enough to guard against the overzealous subordinate who is willing to bend the laws or the

 

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Constitution in what is thought to be the president's interest. No one should be allowed to think that the buck stops short of the president" (Pfiffner 1991, 15).
Because government is so large and complex, the best way for a president to "control" the executive branch is to manage it indirectly, to