The Great Train Robbery Read Online Free PDF Page A

particular they expressed their scepticism about the reliability of certain aspects of his informant’s information about the ‘Goody message’. Significantly Hatherill responded by telling them that, ‘Some of the information concerned had reached him second-hand and it could well have lost some of its accuracy on the way. 2

    Commander Hatherill’s list of fourteen suspects was a particularly significant development, as it provided a list of names, the majority of which were already linked by previous offences and relationships. Unlike DCS Butler’s 16 August suspect list, which was very much a patchwork of names flagged up by a variety of informants whose information varied in terms of quality and past reliability, Hatherill’s list came from one source regarded as knowledgeable and reliable. It is therefore unsurprising, as previously noted, that a good many of the names on Butler’s earlier list were eliminated from the enquiry within days of its compilation.
    Hatherill’s list comprised the following names: 3
Douglas Goody
CRO 4290/46
Charles Wilson
CRO 5010/54
Bruce Reynolds
CRO 41212/48
James White
CRO 26113/55
Henry Smith
CRO 1551/47
Roy James
CRO 17638/56
John Daly
CRO 33521/48
Ronald Edwards
CRO 33535/61
Thomas Wisbey
CRO 26362/47
Danny Pembroke
CRO 27206/56
James Hussey
CRO 40455/49
Brian Field
Roger Cordrey
CRO 3716/42
Robert Welch
CRO 61730/58
Two Post Office men
(Irishmen?) 4
    The tip about the two post office insiders and the specific information they allegedly gave Goody was, as conceded by Hatherill, second-hand and possibly distorted to some extent by the passage of its journey. Despite the IB’s reservations concerning the specific nature of the information given by the alleged insiders, they certainly seem to have been convinced by the proposition that there were at least one or more insiders, as R.F. Yates’s report makes clear:
    Inside Information

    General : One of the important aspects of this case has been the possible leakage of information to the bandits from a member of the staff concerning HVP traffic. This possibility was envisaged from the outset and the result of the detailed inquiries made about 35 officers, 5 but no evidence has come to light that any detailed inside information, or any general knowledge of the movement of HVP money has been passed on.

    Scope : Information regarding the general treatment of HVPs and their transit on the Up Special Travelling Post Office is known to a wide section of Post Office staff and to some professional criminals. It is also widely known in the Post Office that, after a Bank Holiday, a large sum of money would be in transit and therefore, the number of HVPs would be greater than normal. Whilst such general information would be sufficient to stimulate interest amongst criminals to plan a robbery, it would be totally inadequate for a gang to be able to launch a successful attack of the nature of that under review. I hold the view that meticulous planning would be undertaken by criminals of this calibre, that the arrangements would be precise and that, consequently, detailed information would be essential before embarking on such a venture. Furthermore, I think that provision would be made for any changes in procedure to be notified to the gang. Post Office employees in general would not, of course, be in a position to keep abreast of daily changes in TPO working, and the only officers apart from some of high rank or those employed in special security postal work who would be able to furnish impeccable information, are those actually employed on the Up and Down Special TPOs; those attached to the HQ of the TPO Section itself or those employed at railway stations in the loading and unloading of HVP mails from the Up Special TPO.

    Administrative Staff : Discreet but general inquiries have been made without success concerning the supervising and administrative staff at GPO HQ and in LPR but this was cut short when the information mentioned in the