The Descent of Air India Read Online Free PDF

which had been framed along a set of stringent guidelines, was given the go-by and any employee—be it from the clerical cadre of a department—was considered eligible for the post of air hostess or purser. Aptitude became immaterial and so did merit. The airline failed to institutionalise and continue with the strict recruitment norms and training procedures that once gave its service the edge, and thereby lost its advantage over the rest. And as, one by one, the old guard of the In-flight Services Department retired, their absence was reflected in the deteriorating service on-board the flights.
    In the past, a member of the cabin crew had to have a pleasing personality and meet the minimum requirement with respect to height and a maximum limit on weight. Aspirants holding a degree or a diploma in hotel management had been preferred. Moreover, the superannuation age for air hostesses had been low, unlike the present limit of 58 years. The problem of poor selection criteria, lack of training and indifference towards excellence intensified over the years and by the late 1980s, Air India began reeling under their impact.
    Political backing and union pressure—and not merit and aptitude— began to play a greater role in recruitment. This had a dual impact. First, there was a flood of applications from within the airline during every recruitment drive. The job was seen as glamorous, better paying and a ticket to exotic destinations. Clerical, secretarial and security staff, irrespective of their age and aptitude, began to find passage as cabin crew. Second, the quality of service began to decline since most of them had no prior exposure to the world of hospitality and service, and the organisation did not offer a rigorous training programme. Thus, while the number of cabin crew, including air hostesses, grew from a few hundred to nearly 2,000 as the airline’s fleet expanded, the charm and grace of the earlier era disappeared. Passengers soon began complaining about the impersonal service and the overall unpleasant ambience on flights. Even as airlines across the world raised their standards of in-flight experience to sublime levels—first, the Asian, then the European and later, the Gulf airlines—Air India steadily slipped down the scale.
    Naturally, this had disastrous consequences. The brand suffered and the quality of the product declined. There was yet another damaging outcome: Many of the new appointees who had joined as cabin crew from the clerical cadre only to benefit from the perks of the job had strong political and union links. Some among them began to stir up trouble on almost every front. Negotiations for enhanced allowances, issues of productivity and day-to-day operations became acrimonious affairs resulting in delay or cancellation of flights. The intransigent stand of the unions on the changes that were imperative for the upgradation of the services on board the flights affected passenger comfort and the timely departure of flights. As a result, foreign airlines cashed in to attract the once-loyal Air India clientele. It was as if the seeds of decline of Air India’s in-flight services sown in the late 1970s had begun to sprout shoots.
    Was it neglect or complacency that hurt the airline? Or was it an inability to stand up to the growing belligerence of the airline’s unions? Or was it all of these? While the real answer is known only to those who helmed the airline during those years, the truth is that by the late 1980s, the Air India Cabin Crew Association (AICCA) had grown all-powerful, and the duo of Sagar Katrekar and P. Murlidhar, backed by boisterous executive committee members, had led several agitations. In fact, to many of us, it seemed that the two were always calling for some strike or registering some protest or the other. The department had worked with the union without too much acrimony in the past, but what had changed was that the predecessors of the current union leaders, led by Mohan