Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response Read Online Free PDF Page B

star in Fatah, served as Abu-Iyad’s confidant and right-hand man. Al-Omri was cunning, calm under duress, a gifted tactician, and a skilled organizer. It was he who picked up the keys and collected the weapons from the lockers in Munich, and he followed the operation through all its stages. The other men in this innermost circle were Amin Al-Hindi, who later ran an intelligence wing in the Palestinian Authority, and Atef Bseiso, later Fatah’s liaison with European intelligence organizations.
    A second circle consisted of accomplices who, like the couple that smuggled in the four suitcases, knew nothing beyond their personal assignments. They handled forged passports, rented cars and apartments, bought plane tickets, and concealed documents. Many were Palestinians living in Europe. Some were university students, others were part of the Palestinian Diaspora who had settled comfortably in Europe, perhaps married locally, while remaining ardent in their desire to help liberate their stolen homeland from the Zionist oppressor. Close to one hundred people of this sort were in Black September’s employ.

    The Mossad was caught off guard by the scope of Black September’s ambition. Up until May 1972 all the group’s operations were aimed at Jordanian targets. The Mossad frequently reported to Prime Minister Meir’s cabinet that Black September was interested only in harming the kingdom next door. That argument collapsed on May 8, 1972, when Black September took credit for hijacking Sabena Flight 571. Not only was there no warning of the attack, but the Mossad and Military Intelligence utterly failed to recognize what was clearly a strategic shift: a newfound focus on Israeli targets. Even after Sabena, Israeli intelligence agencies continued to insist that Israel was not the main target; the Sabena highjacking was just a ricochet, the price of proximity to Jordan.
    Why did Abu-Iyad choose the Munich Games as the target for a major terror attack? In his book,
Stateless,
Abu-Iyad later wrote that the operation sought to achieve three goals. One was “to present the existence of the Palestinian People to the whole world, whether they like it or not.” Another was “to secure the release of 200 Palestinian fighters locked in Israeli jails.”
    And the third, in a neat encapsulation of the rationale of all terrorists, was this: “to use the unprecedented number of media outlets in one city to display the Palestinian struggle—for better or worse!”

6                    SEIZING THE ATHLETES
    MUNICH, OLYMPIC VILLAGE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1972, 0015H
    The bus was filled with the sounds of backslapping and laughter. The jubilant Israeli athletes were on their way back to the Olympic Village after an evening at the theater. The delegation had just seen
Fiddler on the Roof,
in German, with Shmuel Rodensky, the noted Israeli stage actor, in the lead role. He invited the team backstage during the intermission to meet the cast. They took a group picture: their last.
    Shmuel Lalkin, head of the delegation, sat at the front of the bus, his wife, Yardena, by his side. Arik, his thirteen-year-old son, was hanging out in the back row with the wrestlers and weight lifters. Yossef Romano, David Berger, Mark Slavin, and Eliezer Halfin were crazy about the kid.
    As the bus approached the Olympic Village, Arik sidled up to his father and asked to sleep in the wrestlers’ room. Lalkin refused. His family was not part of the delegation, which meant they slept outside of the village, at their own expense. Arik cried and begged. “Dad, c’mon, I’m a big kid already. They’re my friends. Just one night.” Lalkin did not cave in. He needed to set a personal example for everyone else on the squad. Romano and Halfin came to help Arik out. “We’ll look out for him, Shmuel, don’t worry, it’s only one night. Look how badly he wants to come and, anyway, it’ll just keep us loose.” Lalkin wouldn’t budge. Even a stern