Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide Read Online Free PDF Page A

Islam’s two holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina, to assert that its Wahhabi interpretation of the faith is the authoritative one. Effectively, this means that Muslims of different views, whether Shias, Sufis, reformers, or political dissidents, may find themselves condemned as apostates. For example, the opening fatwa of a Saudi government educational pamphlet rebukes a European imam for his “infidelity” because he “casts doubts about the infidelity of Jews and Christians.” This is a serious charge since, according to the country’s textbooks, which are available online, it is permissible to kill someone for such infidelity, though within the Kingdom itself, prison terms and flogging are more likely.
    Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority, including Ismailis, suffer disproportionately for blasphemy offenses. Among those of the majority Sunni population convicted in recent years were democracy activists, who were imprisoned for using “un-Islamic” terminology, such as
democracy
and
human rights
. Among those given prison terms and lashes for “mocking religion” were teachers who discussed the Bible in class and made favorable comments about Jews and who had written articles arguing that the dominance of radical Islamists over Saudi university culture had harmed the quality of cultural programs.
    In chapter 3 , we describe trends in Iran. Since its 1979 revolution, Iran has had few rivals in suppressing its population in the name of enforcing the state’s religious orthodoxy. Private attacks on those deemed religiously deviant are relatively scarce, but the regime itself targets Baha’is, Jews, converts, Sufis and Sunnis, and increasingly, anyone seen as a political threat. Those deemed possibly dangerous to the powers-that-be include human rights and women’s activists and, especially, Shia intellectuals and clergy who criticize the regime. Since the government claims that Shia Islam is its source of authority, it is particularly susceptible to critiques based on alternative interpretations of Islam. For example, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the architects of
Velayat-e Faqih
, Iran’s system of rule, was detained for six years for his religious criticism of the structure he had helped create. He mocked Ayatollah Khomeini’s edict calling for the death of novelist Salman Rushdie and stated that Iran’s “jailing the enlightened and the elite of society for false reasons” is “condemned and illegitimate.”
    In applying the regime’s statutes on blasphemy and apostasy, Iran’s judges frequently reference their own interpretations of sharia. With little consistency, they convict people on undefined charges such as “friendship with the enemies of God,” “dissension from religious dogma,” or “propagation of spiritual liberalism.” Punishments for these charges include amputation, burning, starvation, and execution. Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, conditions have deteriorated even further, and the increased demonization of Baha’is, Jews, Sufis, and opposition figures may indicate darker days ahead.
    In contrast to Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt has been regarded as a moderate or secular country. It is also one of the leading international proponents of a universal blasphemy law, and, in 2009, Egypt joined with the United States in sponsoring a UN resolution urging states to take “all necessary measures” against religious hate speech. As chapter 4 shows, Egypt’s own laws against insulting a heavenly religion or “creating sectarian strife” have been used to repress criticism of the government and to prevent religious moderation and heterodoxy. Egypt’s reformist Muslim intelligentsia, as well as the Christian community and other minorities, have borne the brunt of the repression. Quranists—a Muslim religious reform movement stressing political freedom—have been sentenced for “insulting religion due to unorthodox Islamic beliefs and practices.” Quranist Sheikh