Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse Read Online Free PDF

him in one chapter is the most convenient way to do this. What follows is therefore wilfully unorthodox in that it expresses precisely the views that this book intends later to seek to demolish. My final two chapters give an account of the engagement that I believe tells it as it was. As this is a bare historical narrative I have not included here the vivid recollections of survivors from Prince of Wales and Repulse. I must also apologize that my chosen approach – to make a statement for the prosecution and then hear the case for the defence – does lead to some repetition.
    The Preliminaries
    Contrary to the Admiralty’s wishes the force it was decided to send to Singapore as a deterrent to Japanese aggression did not consist of older ‘R’ class battleships, but of the new battleship Prince of Wales, the old but fast battle-cruiser Repulse and the newly-completed carrier Indomitable. Unfortunately the latter grounded outside Kingston Harbour on her working-up in the West Indies and was unable to join.
    The appointment of fifty-three-year-old Sir Tom Phillips to command the new Eastern ‘fleet’ – in fact much more of a fast raiding force that could disrupt Japanese invasions – caused considerable consternation in the Navy. Commander in Chief, China, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, was widely respected for his outstanding service as a submarine captain in the First World War, was an experienced flag officer and was already out in the Far East. Many thought him an obvious candidate for the post given to Phillips who had to be jumped up two ranks to Acting Admiral to give him seniority over Layton:
    ‘Phillips was in many ways a strange choice. He had not seen action since 1917 and had not served at sea since the outbreak of war in 1939. Although he was a staff officer of proven ability, he had never been tested in battle as a fighting admiral and he had strong, if mistaken, views of the ability of a modern battleship to fend off attack by means of gunnery alone.’ 2
    Phillips not only lacked relevant experience. He had the reputation as a difficult personality to work with and for being unwilling to listen to anyone who disagreed with him:
    ‘Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips, KCB, aged fifty-three , had been behind a Whitehall desk since 1939 and he had last experienced action in 1917. A very small man – he needed to stand on a box when on the compass platform and was nicknamed “Tom Thumb” – he was notorious for his angry impatience and, more seriously, his strong conviction that aircraft were no match for properly handled warships, arguing that only greater resolution on the ships’ commanding officers was needed to defeat the dive-bomber. He had always refused to listen to anyone who tried to persuade him that fighter protection was necessary for all ships operating within reach of enemy bombers.’ 3
    Phillips, the son of an Army Colonel, had passed out as one of the top students in his year from the then training school HMS Britannia . He served on destroyers in the First World War and as well as staff work in the inter-war years commanded both a destroyer and a cruiser. In 1938 he commanded the destroyer flotillas of the Home Fleet. A collision between HMS Encounter and HMS Furious earned him a reputation as a bad seaman. At the time of his appointment to the Far East he was Vice Chief of Naval Staff and seen widely in the navy as a desk admiral.
    Phillips was notorious for his belief that the well-handled capital ship was more than a match for aircraft: ‘Yet it is probable that Phillips’s views [on the vulnerability of surface ships to aircraft attack] were considerably more out of touch and mistaken than most of his contemporaries.’ 4
    Phillips had acquired a reputation for believing that the well-handled surface vessel was capable of withstanding air attack, an impression confirmed by the Royal Navy’s ability to do just that in early clashes with the Italian air force in the