Porn - Philosophy for Everyone: How to Think With Kink Read Online Free PDF

In the absence of some purpose-driven worldview, it is difficult to elaborate why sex ought to have the significance generally attached to it. If one does not go in for that sort of thing, then there’s little reason, outside of mere social convention, to believe that there is a well-defined “sexual normality.” What if sexual norms are just a matter of social convention?
     
    Insisting that porn stars should follow social norms
because
they are social norms is not justified. After all, there are better and worse social norms and practices, and we ought to give some defense of why a particular set of norms and practices is acceptable. That is part of the point at issue here, so to say that porn stars are “abnormal” because they do not practice monogamy, are exhibitionists, and get paid for “doing it” is no help. The fact that most people do not act like porn stars in bed does not, by itself, mean that what the porn stars are doing is wrong.That is not to say that we cannot place limits on acceptable sexual behavior, as we have suggested above. Informed consent and lack of harm seem to place those limits nicely. But those limits do not depend on “what most people do.”
     
    Even if there is some moral significance to “normal” sex, and some morally right way to do it, that does not establish a necessary connection to our wellbeing. It may be true that being in “normal” sexual relationships makes available to us prudential goods that we might otherwise not realize. However, a connection between those further goods, such as constant companionship, and our welfare would require demonstration, and the connection is likely to be contingent or accidental at best. Showing a relationship may be possible, but those prudential goods would have to be proven
better
than the goods provided by “abnormal” practices, and that is a tall order. However, there is reason to be dubious of the claim that sex plays a special role in wellbeing to begin with. There are some, e.g., priests and clerics of various religions, who
abstain
from any sort of sexual activity, and it would be presumptuous of us to assume that they are necessarily worse off for it.
     
    What about the Aristotelian claim that virtue is a necessary condition for human flourishing? Will being morally good climax in my own wellbeing, or at least make wellbeing possible? Putting it bluntly, no. Many philosophers have noted that one can conceive of a perfectly
immoral
person enjoying personal welfare in spite of his wickedness; doing so does not result in contradiction, which means such a case is logically possible. Thus, being virtuous is not necessary for our personal welfare. What of other moral theories? Is
acting
morally a condition of the good life? Again, it does not seem so. Utilitarianism’s value maximizing principle leaves open the possibility, despite the fact that the valued end is both morally and prudentially valuable, that doing the “right thing” would force us to sacrifice our own welfare for that of others. Kant’s deontology severs clean the connection between welfare and ethics; we are obligated to follow morality’s principles
regardless
of how it affects the quality of our lives. Taking a cue from the utilitarians and Kant, then, we should understand morality as setting limits on our quality of life, or at least the ways in which we are allowed to pursue it. However, being moral is not a
condition
for our wellbeing, and it is perfectly conceivable that a villain could enjoy as much prudential quality of life as the rest of us.Thus, even if those working in the porn industry are
doing
something immoral, or have tarnished characters, it does not follow that they are “worse off” from the perspective of their own welfare. Neither does it follow that having immoral things happen to us necessarily inhibits our welfare. To see why the latter is true, we need to sharpen the distinction between moral and prudential value.
     
    Ways of