Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944 Read Online Free PDF Page A

with Admiral Panteleyev aboard, lay wallowing after a mine exploded in one of her paravanes. The mine layer Skoriy (‘Rapid’) took her in tow, only herself to hit a mine and sink half an hour later. The best remembered casualty was the Vironia , with her gaggle of glamorous civilians. Listing to starboard and pouring smoke, she was already under tow when she hit a mine at 9.45 p.m. Soviet accounts describe dark figures leaping from the burning quarterdeck, the sound of the ‘Internationale’ drifting across the water, and the crack of revolvers as her officers took their own lives in the moments before she slid beneath the waves.
    Shortly before midnight, the surviving ships anchored in the midst of the mines and waited for better visibility. With daylight, they weighed anchor and the carnage resumed. By the end of the afternoon six more ships had been sunk by mines and eight by bombs, and two tugs had been captured by Finnish patrol boats. Among the casualties were the transport Five Year Plan , with three thousand troops aboard, and the patrol ship Sneg (‘Snow’), which had picked up survivors from the Vironia . Four more damaged ships, three of them transports, managed to beach themselves on the island of Gogland (Hogland to Swedes, Suursaari to Finns), from which troops (among them the remnants of the 5th Motorised Rifle Regiment) were picked up in small boats and taken to Kronshtadt. The remainder of the flotilla limped into port over the next four days. The whole operation had cost sixty-five vessels and perhaps 14,000 lives. 31
    It was the worst disaster in Russian naval history, at least twice as costly as the defeat of the tsarist navy by the Japanese – the first time an Asian power defeated a European one at sea – at Tsu-Shima in 1905. Later, arguments abounded as to what went wrong. Kuznetsov and Panteleyev both supported the decision to defend Tallinn, but thought that civilians should have been evacuated far earlier, blaming Voroshilov for not ordering plans in good time. The convoys would have done better to take to deeper water, running the gauntlet of German submarines but avoiding the shore batteries and most of the minefields. Obviously, they should also have included more minesweepers (‘But where could we have got them?’ asked Kuznetsov). Today’s military historians question the defence of Tallinn itself, which cost about 20,000 soldiers taken prisoner and pinned down only four German divisions, making little difference to the fighting further east. 32
    The underlying problem, though, was that of the whole Soviet command: senior officers’ well-founded fear of advocating retreat until it became inevitable, and inevitably disastrous. Instructive is the story of Vyacheslav Kaliteyev, captain of the Kazakhstan , the largest troopship in the flotilla. Knocked unconscious by a bomb that hit the bridge soon after departure on the first morning of the evacuation, he fell into the sea and was lucky to be picked up by a submarine, which took him to Kronshtadt. Meanwhile the Kazakhstan limped on, aflame, under her seven surviving crew, depositing her passengers on a sandspit before arriving at Kronshtadt four days later – the only troopship to do so. Immediately an investigation was launched. Why had Kaliteyev abandoned his ship? Why had he returned ahead of her? Had he deliberately jumped overboard? The crewmen who nursed the Kazakhstan home were rewarded with Orders of the Red Banner in a special communiqué from Stavka. Kaliteyev was executed by firing squad, for ‘cowardice’ and ‘desertion under fire’. 33

Part 2
    The Siege Begins: September–December 1941

    Bread ration coupons, December 1941

    In order that we should understand things fully, the winter of nineteen forty-one was given to us as a measure
     
    Konstantin Simonov

6
    â€˜No Sentimentality’
    This was the beginning of the blockade. The mistakes had been made, the