Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun Read Online Free PDF Page A

decisive role of the aircraft carrier as the primary bearer of naval offensive power. Despite the grievous losses, on the day the
Yamato
anchored at Hashirajima and officers began their deliberations, the Combined Fleet still possessed eight aircraft carriers, twice as many as the U.S. Pacific Fleet. While it was true the Americans had three heavy carriers in the Pacific to Yamamoto’s two, the Imperial Navy vessels had spaces for 382 aircraft, compared to 300 on the U.S. warships. Moreover, the Japanese had another carrier already fitting out to join the fleet and two more in late stages of construction. The American industrial colossus would deliver only small escort carriers during 1942, and more than two-thirds of them went to the Atlantic. The U.S. building program would not hit its stride until the following year. For the moment Japan retained the advantage.
    As for aircraft, the Imperial Navy was as strong as it had been at the beginning of the war. Until May and June, which featured the successive carrier battles of the Coral Sea—the first significant action of the Solomons campaign—and Midway, Japanese air losses had been limited. Production kept pace. From the outset of fighting through the end of June, according to Imperial Navy records, Japanese naval air losses totaled 1,641 aircraft. Almost half occurred during the months of Coral Sea and Midway, the bulk in June and many of those at Midway itself. Over the same period aircraft deliveries numbered 1,620. The most significant shortfall was in single-engine attack aircraft—dive-bombers and torpedo planes—where 374 were lost against 240 new warplanes. Commander Okumiya Masatake, an air staff officer and experienced pilot, records that at mid-July 1942 the naval air force order of battle was slightly stronger in fighters than before the war, though it had declined by roughly a quarter in attack aircraft. Land-based medium-bomber strength was actually greater than it had been on December 7, 1941.
    Apart from numbers of planes with the forces, the Imperial Navy was also in good shape with respect to new aircraft designs. It is hardly noticedin histories that two of the three fighters that promised significant advances over the Zero were already in advanced development. The J2M Raiden (Jack), already in prototype, had made its maiden flight in March 1942. Another warplane, the N1K1-J Shiden (George) prototype, was under construction. It would fly for the first time in December. The plane the Navy specifically intended to follow the Zero, the A7M Reppu (Sam), to be innovated by the Zero’s designer and manufacturer, Horikoshi Jiro and Mitsubishi, had earlier been put on hold, but in April 1942 was dusted off, with specifications issued a month after Midway. A carrier bomber to replace the current standard was already present in small numbers at Midway, though problems forced the Navy to convert it to a scout. The next-generation bomber, also exhibiting problems, had been delayed but would be ready for carrier landing trials by the end of the year, and
its
follow-on existed as a prototype by May 1942. New-model floatplanes were being tested at that same time. Only in the category of heavy bombers were the Japanese significantly behind their adversaries.
    As regards pilots, the Japanese were also in relatively good shape. The Navy had begun the war with nearly 2,000 pilots, almost all of them quite expert, and about half of whom were carrier-qualified. Careful studies later showed that most of the initial cadre had more than 600 hours of flying experience, many of them master pilots with thousands of hours in the air. A typical U.S. Army Air Force pilot in the autumn of 1942 went to the front with 300 flight hours. Casualties at Midway were not so bad as advertised. Study there shows that a large majority of
Kido Butai
aircrew returned despite the sinking of their ships. Somewhat more than a hundred crews or pilots perished. Again the worst aspect was that losses