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ordered structure of the world, and that of a machine is caused by intelligent design, we may infer ‘by all the rules of analogy’ that the cause of the ordered structure of the world is also intelligent design. As the structure of the world so much surpasses that of a machine, so, by analogy, the mind of the author of nature surpasses that of a man. He is proved to be ‘somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed’.
    In giving this argument, Cleanthes has claimed to be inferring a cause from an effect, and to be arguing analogically. But he has not, of course, given any detailed account of these principles ofreasoning. By the device of having Philo suggest that Demea’s vehement objection to the argument arises in part from his failing to see its logical structure, Hume introduces some of his own theory of such reasoning through Philo’s ‘restatement’ of it. Philo paraphrases Hume to establish that ‘experience alone can point out to [anyone] the true cause of any phenomenon’. It follows that whether or not such phenomena as ‘order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes’ are caused by design is something which can be established only by experience. If we consider only what is
a priori
conceivable, then it could be that the material world has a cause of its order inherent within it. Subtly, Philo brings out that Cleanthes must be assuming that the ideas in God’s mind cause order in the world by themselves being ordered and structured, and similarly the ideas in the mind of a human being who makes a watch or a house ‘arrange themselves so as to form the plan’. So Cleanthes is committed to the possibility of
some
things being inherently ordered.
A priori
, it could be matter as much as mind which has a cause of order inherent in it. So Cleanthes is claiming that it is from experience that we know that matter is not, but mind is, inherently ordered. Philo implies that all of this is already tacitly contained in Cleanthes’ initial argument. By thus ‘restating’ it in terms of Hume’s philosophy, Philo in fact identifies some of the weak points in it. But Cleanthes is invited to confirm that Philo has ‘made a fair representation of it’, and does so.
    Throughout Part II Philo raises a series of difficulties with Cleanthes’ method of argument, some of which are explored further in other parts. He objects, for example, that the analogy between the world and a machine is not close enough to permit the inference to design in the case of the world to be anything more than a conjecture. He points out that we know that design is a cause of order only in human activities, and these are a tiny part of the universe. Can we make such a small part a rule for the whole? He suggests that since the universe taken as a whole is a special, unique case, we simply have no relevant experience at all from which we could infer its cause. For himself, he says, so far as reason goes, he is content to say that he does not knowwhat is the cause of the ordered, structured and purposeful world.
    Hume’s introduction of his own epistemology into the
Dialogues
as a critical weapon can be seen also in the case of Demea. From Part II to Part VIII , Cleanthes’ design argument is thoroughly examined. As a result, it appears full of difficulties, and open to many doubts. Demea thinks such an argument, which Cleanthes asserted to be the only possible way to establish results in natural theology, is wholly inadequate as a basis for religious belief. In its place, he offers a ‘simple and sublime argument
a priori’
which will be ‘infallible’. This is a version of what is known as the cosmological argument. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its existence. In considering the series of causes of things, we must either think