History of the Second World War Read Online Free PDF Page B

to declare war in support of Poland — the French Ambassador’s dispatch said: ‘One of the most excited was Mr Winston Churchill; bursts of his voice made the telephone vibrate.’ In March, too, Churchill had declared himself ‘in the most complete agreement with the Prime Minister’ over the offer to guarantee Poland. Along with almost all Britain’s political leaders he had dwelt on its value as a means of preserving peace. Mr Lloyd George had been alone in pointing out its impracticability and danger — and his warning was described by The Times as ‘an outburst of inconsolable pessimism from Mr Lloyd George, who now seems to inhabit an odd and remote world of his own.’
    For balance, it should be mentioned that these illusions about the prospects were not shared in the more sober military circles.§ But in general the prevailing mood of the moment was supercharged with emotions that drowned the sense of immediate realities, and obscured the long view.
     
    § My own strategic appreciation written at the outbreak of war, forecasting the early defeat of Poland and the likelihood that France would not long continue the fight, epitomised the situation in its conclusion: ‘In sum, by making our stand on ground that was strategically unsound we have got into a very bad hole — perhaps the worst in our history.’
     
    Could Poland have held out longer? Could France and Britain have done more than they did to take the German pressure off Poland? On the face of the figures of armed strength, as now known, the answer to both questions would at first sight seem to be ‘Yes’. In numbers of men Poland had sufficient to check the German forces on her front, and at the least impose a long delay on their advance. It is equally apparent, on the figures, that the French should have been able to defeat the German forces left to oppose them in the West.
    The Polish Army consisted of thirty active divisions and ten reserve divisions. It had also no less than twelve large cavalry brigades — although only one of them was motorised. Its potential strength in numbers was even larger than the total figure of divisions conveys — for Poland had nearly 2,500,000 ‘trained men’ available to mobilise.
    France mobilised the equivalent of no divisions, of which no less than sixty-five were active divisions. They included five cavalry divisions, two mechanised divisions, and one armoured division that was in process of being formed — the rest being infantry. Of the grand total, even after providing for the defence of southern France and North Africa against a possible threat from Italy, the French Command were able to concentrate eighty-five divisions on their northern front facing Germany. Moreover, they could mobilise 5,000,000 trained men.
    Britain had promised to send four Regular divisions to France at the outset of war — besides providing for the defence of the Middle East and the Far East — and actually sent the equivalent of five divisions. Because of the problem of sea transport, however, and the circuitous route considered necessary to avoid air attack, this initial contingent could not arrive until late in September.
    Besides her small but high quality Regular Army, Britain was just in the process of forming and equipping a Territorial field army of twenty-six divisions, and on the outbreak of war the Government had made plans for expanding the total to fifty-five divisions. But the first contingent of this new force would not be ready to enter the field until 1940. Meantime, Britain’s main contribution could only be in the traditional form of naval power exercising a sea blockade — a form of pressure that was inherently slow to take effect.
    Britain had a bomber force of just over 600 — double that of France, though considerably less than half that of Germany — but in view of the limited size and range of the machines then in service, it could exert no serious effect by direct attack on Germany.
    Germany