lives upon the territorial integrity of Poland. History, which, we are told, is mainly the record of the crimes, follies, and miseries of mankind, may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six years’ policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transformation almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale. . . .
Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground, which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people.*
* Churchill: The Second World War , vol I, pp. 311-12. Full biographical details of all books referred to in the text can be found on p. 715.
It is a striking verdict on Chamberlain’s folly, written in hindsight. For Churchill himself had, in the heat of the moment, supported Chamberlain’s pressing offer of Britain’s guarantee to Poland. It is only too evident that in 1939 he, like most of Britain’s leaders, acted on a hot-headed impulse — instead of with the cool-headed judgement that was once characteristic of British statesmanship.
CHAPTER 2 - THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE OUTBREAK
On Friday September 1, 1939, the German armies invaded Poland. On Sunday, the 3rd, the British Government declared war on Germany, in fulfilment of the guarantee it had earlier given to Poland. Six hours later the French Government, more hesitantly, followed the British lead.
In making his fateful announcement to the British Parliament the seventy-year old Prime Minister, Mr Chamberlain, finished by saying: ‘I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established.’ Within less than a month Poland had been overrun. Within nine months most of Western Europe had been submerged by the spreading flood of war. And although Hitler was ultimately overthrown, a liberated Europe was not re-established.
In welcoming the declaration of war, Mr Arthur Greenwood, speaking for the Labour Party, expressed his relief that ‘the intolerable agony of suspense from which all of us have suffered is over. We now know the worst.’ From the volume of cheers it was clear that he was expressing the general feeling of the House. He ended: ‘May the war be swift and short, and may the peace which follows stand proudly for ever on the shattered ruin of an evil name.’
No reasonable calculation of the respective forces and resources provided any ground for believing that the war could be ‘swift and short’, or even for hoping that France and Britain alone would be able to overcome Germany — however long the war continued. Even more foolish was the assumption that ‘We now know the worst’.
There were illusions about the strength of Poland. Lord Halifax — who, as Foreign Minister, ought to have been well-informed — believed that Poland was of more military value than Russia, and preferred to secure her as an ally. That was what he conveyed to the American Ambassador on March 24, a few days before the sudden decision to offer the British guarantee to Poland. In July, the Inspector-General of the Forces, General Ironside, visited the Polish Army and on his return gave what Mr Churchill described as ‘most favourable’ reports.*
* Churchill: The Second World War, vol. I, p. 357.
There were still greater illusions about the French Army. Churchill himself had described it as ‘the most perfectly trained and faithful mobile force in Europe’.† When he saw General Georges, the Commander-in-Chief of the French field armies, a few days before the war, and saw the comparative figures of French and German strength, he was so favourably impressed as to say: ‘But you are the masters.’‡
† April 14, 1938.
‡ Churchill: The Second World War, vol. I, p. 357.
This may have increased the eagerness with which he joined in pressing the French to hasten