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were dismayed to find no permanent facilities. There was only a dirt runway hacked out of the kunai grass, a “hangar” made from a piece of corrugated roofing supported by four poles, and a few thatch-roofed huts for accommodation. Murphy’s biggest concern was the lack of dispersal sites. With no revetments available, the Hudsons were parked like sitting ducks alongside the runway.
    The fourth Lockheed arrived on December 8 after undergoing an engine change. By then, word of the Japanese attacks had reached the squadron. As officer-in-charge of the four Hudsons, Murphy began sending outarmed patrols and made his first operational flight on December 9. He attempted to intercept a high-flying aircraft, strongly suspected to be a Japanese reconnaissance plane, but was not successful.
    Six days later, Flt. Lt. Kenneth J. Erwin hit pay dirt during a photographic mission over Kapingamarangi Atoll, about four hundred miles northeast of Rabaul. The site of a refueling station for Japanese seaplanes, it was the only enemy installation within range of the Hudsons. Making two passes over the atoll that morning, Erwin counted nineteen barges, a variety of shore facilities, and a merchant ship. The latter fired at him with its small-caliber guns.
    Erwin returned to Vunakanau and reported his findings, whereupon Murphy ordered a bombing mission. Two additional Hudsons were available, so Erwin guided Murphy and a third crew back to the target area. Finding the merchantman about twenty miles north of Kapingamarangi, the three Hudsons made individual attack runs. “ I was the first to drop a bomb ,” Murphy wrote later, “and therefore believe I was the first pilot in the Southwest Pacific Area to attack the enemy.” It is a point worth emphasizing: just a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, a flight of three RAAF Hudsons from Rabaul made an impromptu attack against a Japanese merchant ship. For the record, Australia attacked first, not the other way around.
    But dropping a bomb is only half of the equation. Actually hitting a moving target, especially a zigzagging ship, is difficult. The pilots of 24 Squadron had never practiced it in training, and to make matters worse, they had to attack the ship from high altitude to avoid damaging their own aircraft. “At that time we only had instantaneous fuses,” recalled Murphy, “and so had to attack at altitude with bomb sights that were anything but accurate.”
    Making two bomb runs apiece, the Hudsons caused no apparent damage. Had they attacked in formation, releasing their bombs in a salvo, they might have gotten lucky. As it was, the merchantman had a relatively easy time dodging the six small bombs dropped individually.
    Deeply frustrated by the mission’s outcome, Murphy and the others expected some negative reaction from RAAF headquarters, but no one was prepared for the hostile wave of criticism that ensued. Wing Commander Lerew, arriving at Rabaul with a flight of Wirraways the day after the mission, caught the worst of it. As soon as he climbed down from his aircraft, he washanded a decoded message. “ It was addressed to me from the Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Burnett,” Lerew remembered. “He expressed clearly his disappointment with the poor effort that had been put up by the squadron in missing the ship and stated that unless better results were achieved, the entire squadron would be replaced immediately.”
    Lerew was flabbergasted by the threat from the top man in the RAAF. Burnett, born in Minnesota and raised in England, had spent twenty-two years in the Royal Air Force prior to his appointment in Australia. His criticism seemed to stem from a monumental ego, as though he might force 24 Squadron to improve by sheer will. He had the option of replacing Lerew and bringing him back to Australia in disgrace, but he took no action. Thus, his message accomplished little except to antagonize the squadron.
    Lerew was also reprimanded by Wing Cmdr. William H.