that where there is oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?
E UTHYPHRO : Surely.
S OCRATES : This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether where [d] there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice. Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?
E UTHYPHRO : No, but like that, for what you say appears to be right.
S OCRATES : See what comes next: if the pious is a part of the just, we must, it seems, find out what part of the just it is. Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or do you not think so?
E UTHYPHRO : I do.
[e] S OCRATES : Try in this way to tell me what part of the just the pious is, in order to tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to indict me for ungodliness, since I have learned from you sufficiently what is godly and pious and what is not.
E UTHYPHRO : I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.
S OCRATES : You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of [13] information. I do not know yet what you mean by care, for you do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, as, for example, we say, don’t we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does.
E UTHYPHRO : Yes, I do mean it that way.
S OCRATES : So horse breeding is the care of horses.
E UTHYPHRO : Yes.
S OCRATES : Nor does everyone know how to care for dogs, but the hunter does.
E UTHYPHRO : That is so.
S OCRATES : So hunting is the care of dogs.
E UTHYPHRO : Yes. [b]
S OCRATES : And cattle raising is the care of cattle.
E UTHYPHRO : Quite so.
S OCRATES : While piety and godliness is the care of the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?
E UTHYPHRO : It is.
S OCRATES : Now care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and the benefit of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are benefited and become better. Or do you not think so?
E UTHYPHRO : I do.
S OCRATES : So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so with all the others. Or do you think that care aims to harm the [c] object of its care?
E UTHYPHRO : By Zeus, no.
S OCRATES : It aims to benefit the object of its care?
E UTHYPHRO : Of course.
S OCRATES : Is piety then, which is the care of the gods, also to benefit the gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better?
E UTHYPHRO : By Zeus, no.
S OCRATES : Nor do I think that this is what you mean—far from it—but that is why I asked you what you meant by the care of gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care. [d]
E UTHYPHRO : Quite right, Socrates, that is not the kind of care I mean.
S OCRATES : Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would piety be?
E UTHYPHRO : The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.
S OCRATES : I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods.
E UTHYPHRO : Quite so.
S OCRATES : Could you tell me to the achievement of what goal service to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health?
E UTHYPHRO : I think so.
S OCRATES : What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is [e] it directed?
E UTHYPHRO : Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship.
S OCRATES : And service to housebuilders to the building of a house?
E UTHYPHRO : Yes.
S OCRATES : Tell me then, my good sir, to the achievement of what aim does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine.
E UTHYPHRO : And I am telling the truth, Socrates.
S