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headgear.’
    This was not the first indication that something had gone wrong with the second explosion. On the actual day of the test, when Perkins came on duty at 4 p.m., his job was to transmit reports from the journalists who had watched the blast. Suddenly a signal came in direct from Sydney. It was a message from the acting Australian Prime Minister, Sir Arthur Fadden, to the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden. It was a very short message and, in the light of what has since emerged about the British nuclear tests, one which might reasonably have been sent somewhat sooner. ‘What the bloody hell is going on?’ Fadden demanded. ‘The cloud is drifting over the mainland.’

Chapter Two
‘
He ought to stick to science
’
    Ernest Bevin on Professor Patrick Blackett’s advice not to build the atom bomb
    The Australian Prime Minister’s frantic signal to London as the atomic cloud drifted over the mainland in June 1956 stands out as one of the few occasions on which the Australian government took issue with Britain over the atom bomb tests. For the most part, Australia was only too ready to offer facilities for weapons testing - one of the few conditions imposed on the British by the Australians during the tests at Emu Field in 1953 was a requirement that, on religious grounds, bombs should not be exploded on a Sunday. The relationship between the two countries in those early days seems to have resembled a marriage between a reluctant bridegroom and a very willing bride: Australia granted Britain’s request, in 1950, to be allowed to test her first bomb on Australian territory, and then waited patiently on the sidelines while the British government tried to set up a better deal elsewhere.
    The request came in the form of a highly classified message from the British Prime Minister, Clem Attlee, to Menzies on 16 September 1950. It was simple, and in two parts. Would Australia allow Britain’s bomb to be tested on her territory and, if so, could the British carry out a survey of the Monte Bello Islands, a site which had been recommended by the British Admiralty?
    The background to this request, Attlee explained, was that Britain had already sought permission from the US government to use Eniwetok, an atoll in the South Pacific on which several American bombs had been tested, but was still waiting for a reply. In the circumstances, Britain had no choice but to look around for alternative facilities.
    Only three days later, Menzies replied, agreeing in principleto both the atom bomb test and the survey. (Neither the Australian nor the British electorates were to know anything about these negotiations until eighteen months later, when plans were well advanced.) In November, the British survey party set out for the Monte Bellos but the fate of the islands was not yet sealed. The British also investigated seven possible sites in Canada and one, near Churchill, Manitoba, looked promising. It was ruled out because the sea was too shallow to use ships near the shore, and the British had already decided their first test should simulate an atom bomb attack on a harbour.
    The survey party which visited the Monte Bellos reported back in January 1951. The four main islands in the group were ‘inhospitable’, they said, with no shade and no water supply. Dr William Penney, the scientist in charge of the trial, was in favour of using the site, as long as the British navy could cope with the heavy calls which would be made on it - including the provision of an aircraft-carrier fitted with workshops and laboratories, and several other ships.
    But even at this point, when the British government asked the Australians for formal approval of a test in the Monte Bellos in October 1952, it had not given up hope of doing a deal with the Americans. The Australian government obligingly gave its formal permission in May, but the British postponed a final decision while they waited for a reply to a