Clinton Cash Read Online Free PDF

conference. 21 For the former president it was a reunion of sorts. Clinton and Nazarbayev had first met back in 1994, when the Kazakh autocrat came to Washington to meet the new president. 22 The two discussed several topics and signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership, “which recognized Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform.” 23 Nazarbayev had a habit of signing documents he had no intention of honoring. Clinton and Nazarbayev met again in December 1999, when they discussed a number of issues, one of which likely included concerns involving two mining and metal companies that were having troubles in Kazakhstan. A Canadian firm, World Wide Minerals, and a London-based firm, Trans-World Metals, had seen property confiscated by the Kazakh government. 24
    The September 2005 visit had been organized in part by Sergei Kurzin, a round-faced Russian nuclear physicist from Siberia who had done business in Kazakhstan before. In additionto arranging the meeting in Almaty, he assisted Giustra in creating UrAsia Energy. 25
    It’s unclear if Kurzin and Clinton had met before, but they would have several more meetings in the years that followed. And they had something else in common: fugitive financier Marc Rich. Recall that in January 2001, on his last day in office, Clinton had issued a presidential pardon for Rich. Kurzin had previously worked for Rich traveling around Russia in search of suitable investment opportunities. 26
    Kurzin, in a 2008 interview with New York Times reporters Jo Becker and Don Van Natta, said about the visit, “timing was everything.” 27 After the Times piece ran, Kurzin reported getting an angry phone call from Giustra. The secretive Canadian “yelled like hell at me over the phone after he saw the piece,” Kurzin said later. “He was furious that I talked to a journalist.” 28
    What transpired at dinner with Clinton, Nazarbayev, and Giustra depends on whom you ask. It was by all accounts a lavish affair, with upward of seventy-five guests.
    Bill maintained that the entire visit was about dealing with HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan. Giustra insisted that the mining deal he wanted to secure did not involve Nazarbayev or the Kazakh government. As he put it, “The mining agreements I reached in Kazakhstan were concluded after lengthy negotiations with private companies—not the Kazakhstan government.” 29 Bill has gone even further, claiming that “formal endorsement from the Kazakh government was not required to acquire the assets.” 30 He went on to make a technical legal argument: “Kazatomprom was not a signatory to either of the memorandums of understanding signed by Mr. Giustra’s company.” 31
    But these were, at best, elaborate evasions. Corporate executives for the uranium company later admitted to journalists and US diplomats that Kazakh officials absolutely needed to signoff on the deal. Jean Nortier, CEO of the company that would eventually control the assets, said, “When you do a transaction in Kazakhstan, you need the government’s approval. UrAsia got the approval, and when UrAsia merged with Uranium One, that approval was given again.” 32
    Leaked State Department cables from the US ambassador in Kazakhstan further refute Bill Clinton’s claim. Giustra acquired the assets in Kazakhstan through his shell company UrAsia Energy and then transferred those assets through a merger with a company called Uranium One. 33 According to a 2009 US diplomatic cable revealed by WikiLeaks, Paul Lewis Clarke, senior vice president of Uranium One, claimed that Uranium One’s UrAsia acquisitions “were approved by many of the same people still in power,” including the then prime minister Danial Akhmetov (who later became minister of defense), and “Kazatomprom president [Vladimir] Shkolnik, then the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources.” 34 Any asset transfer of uranium rights needed to be approved by Kazakh officials. 35
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