cease-fire and present insurgent groups have unconscionably stripped the country of much of its unique teak forests and other hardwood resources. They have exploited its extensive mines without concern for pollution and have constructed (and planned) dozens of hydroelectric projects that dammed previously free rivers and forcibly evacuated thousands. More generally, the regime disregards modern environmental policies and guidelines.
A crisis of fear that permeates society. The population fears the state’s administrative control mechanisms and military power. The military administration itself fears and mistrusts foreigners and is anxious about a possible invasion that some foreign rhetoric seems to imply. Military disdain and mistrust extends to their own civilian citizens and ethnic minorities; they are concerned that a return to civilian rule would lead to the break-up of the state. Fear leads to official censorship and even self-inflicted restraint as a defense. Myanmar is listed as having one of the world’s most controlled censorship regimes—164th out of 168 countries.
A private sector crisis. The state’s 1988 reforms, the most ambitious since 1962, were to encourage the private sector through attracting foreign investment and spurring local industry and trade. It has, however, prompted widespread rent-seeking and corruption with meager resultsfor the people, no matter how much the administration has benefited from exploitation of its natural gas and other reserves.
A crisis of distribution. In 1988, the pauperized government that was on the cusp of the coup had only about US$30 million in foreign exchange reserves. In 2008, it had over US$3.1 billion but has not used these resources to improve the quality of life or standard of living of its diverse peoples.
A crisis of internally perceived legitimacy. How the people of that state perceive the legitimacy of its administration is in question. Indigenous cultural-religious factors affect these views and their expectations of the state’s obligation to deliver goods and services. Foreign influences and opinions on the nature of political legitimacy may also affect these internal perceptions, but among what groups beyond the internationally oriented elite and to what degree is uncertain.
The scope and complexity of the problems facing the state and its peoples are set forth here to allow a context to begin considering what factors have influenced the generation of these problems. We can start to analyze the causes and historical context of these questions; the various Burmese governments’ attempts to cope with equity, growth, history, legitimacy, and international relations; and how the external world, in an age of globalization, has reacted to them.
To do this, we need to review historically the contemporary residual influences of four ages of Burmese history: the precolonial era of the monarchy (until 1885) in chapter 2 , the colonial period (1885–1948) in chapter 3 , the civilian government (1948–1962) in chapter 4 , and military rule under the socialist government (1962–1988) in chapter 5 . Each has had extensive impacts on current events ( chapter 6 ), and each influenced and is reflected in the state’s social and political structure ( chapter 7 ) and will likely influence the future ( chapter 8 ).
2
IMPORTANT RESIDUES FROM THE PRECOLONIAL PERIOD
The Burmese look with increasing pride on their precolonial history. No group has more assiduously made contemporary use of the record of approximately 1,000 years of Burman hegemony of the region we now call Burma/Myanmar and some neighboring areas than the present State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military government. They have used the past to justify the present, even employing prehistory to support their nationalistic (sometimes chauvinistic) claims to legitimacy. Members of the military consider themselves custodians of national unity and