Attack on Pearl Harbor Read Online Free PDF Page A

between spending money on new warships or on forward bases, the Japanese placed a priority on warships. And, according to the treaties awarding control of the Mandate Islands to Japan, the islands were not to be fortified.
    Even today the Japanese like to believe that the islands were unfortified. Agawa relates a story from 1937 where the American naval attaché in Tokyo sought permission to visit the Mandates but was refused, “not that [the IJN] did not want him to see installations being built in that area, but that it was afraid he might find out that there were no decent military installations at all; it wanted to leave him with the impression that some did, in fact, exist.” 60
    However, this is disingenuous.
    The islands in question were Class “C” Mandated Islands under the League of Nations, where the occupying nation administered the territory under its own laws, in this case as if the islands were part of Japan. They were not allowed to fortify the islands.
    However, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations without returning the Mandates, and from 1937 they ignored restrictions on military development. Japan publicly insisted that it was not fortifying the islands; however, there was brisk development of ports and airfields and associated facilities for “economic development,” facilities that certainly would have dual-use military applications in wartime. The exact extent of the development was difficult for outsiders to determine, since Japan discouraged travel to the islands, controlled entry rigorously, and guarded the sea approaches. Shipwrecked mariners were confined, closely guarded, and removed from the islands promptly. Westerners referred to them as “Japan’s Islands of Mystery.”
    By June 1941, $28 million (equivalent to nearly $1 billion in 2009 dollars) had been expended throughout the Mandates, including $7 million ($250 million) on Saipan, Tinian, and Pagan in the Marianas. Facilities included airfields on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, Saipan in the Marianas, and Truk, along with port facilities such as piers, warehouses, and workshops. In 1939–40 seaplane tenders Chitose , Kamoi , and Kinugasa Maru carried construction crews and technicians to build seaplane ramps at Truk, Palau, Kwajalein, and Saipan. The tenders made several round trips to Japan to obtain additional construction supplies.
    The Japanese insisted that these facilities were built for economic development. However, over the years, it was apparent that the authority controlling the location and design of coastal and island facilities shifted from civilians to the Japanese Navy. When examining the plans for such facilities as Aslito Airfield on Saipan (begun in 1934), it was found that most buildings were constructed to be bombproof and designed for easy conversion into military use, such as a facility for the assembly of aerial torpedoes. Many of these airfields, such as those on Saipan and Kwajalein, were used to launch air strikes in the opening hours of the war. The seaplane ramps facilitated operations of long-range Japanese reconnaissance flying boats such as the H8K Mavis.
    While the Japanese limited development of fleet support bases, they did develop outlying islands to support offensive operations by bombers, reconnaissance planes, and submarines. In the context of the original Japanese strategy, overseas bases designed for the long-term forward sustainment and repair of the fleet would not be necessary. The war was supposed to be short, so it would be unlikely that seriously damaged warships could be repaired in time to participate in further actions. The decisive battle would be close to the Empire, so forward bases might be expected to fall to the enemy in the course of the Fabian retreat or be bypassed and isolated, so even the offensive base development was limited to the bare necessities. All that would be needed in the way of forward bases would be limited facilities to service reconnaissance