America's Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve Read Online Free PDF Page A

superior is unknowable, but it seems likely. All we have is the account of Willis, who averred that the president-elect “recognized the fact that such an organization was politically impossible even if economically desirable” (ibid., 146).
    “You are far on the right track”: Wilson to Carter Glass, December 31, 1912, in Arthur S. Link,
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–1989), 25:650; Glass,
An Adventure in Constructive Finance,
81–82; and Willis,
The Federal Reserve System,
146, 147.
    “perhaps, an hour with Mr. Wilson”: Glass to Willis, December 29, 1912.
    “We may ourselves have in readiness”: Carter Glass to Wilson, December 29, 1912, in
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,
25:641–42.
    “It is clear to me”: Glass to Willis, December 29, 1912.
    “I am not entirely convinced”: Carter Glass to Willis, January 3, 1913, Willis Papers, Box 1.
    Forgan, the leader: James Laughlin to Willis, January 10, 1913, ibid., Box 7.
    Glass and Willis did not even disclose: Gabriel Kolko,
The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900
–
1914
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 225–26; Robert Craig West,
Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve, 1863
–
1923
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), 113–15; and Willis,
The Federal Reserve System,
151.
    “in good humor toward the hearings”: Willis to Carter Glass, December 31, 1912, Willis Papers, Box 20.
    “no one would claim”:
Banking and Currency Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
4.
    “ Would you say that we should do nothing”: The quoted portions of Warburg testimony come from ibid., 77, 67, 69, and 73. Warburg was not at all candid about his involvement with the Aldrich Plan (he referred sympathetically to the “framers” of the Plan, without divulging that he himself was one of them).
    Glass repeatedly trotted out: Glass was upfront about his political motivations. In his cross-examination of Festus Wade, the chairman observed, “The situation, frankly, has its political aspects. I do not mean to say that anybody is proposing to mix politics with the reformation of the currency; but understand that the majority members of this committee are confronted by the platform declaration of the Democratic Party against the so-called Aldrich Plan” (ibid., 206).
    “no scheme would be considered”: Warburg,
The Federal Reserve System,
1:89.
    Prominent bankers: Willis to Carter Glass, January 18, January 20, and January 23, 1912, all in Willis Papers, Box 20; and James Neal Primm,
A Foregone
Conclusion
(St. Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1989), chapter 2, “Banking Reform 1907–1913”; available at www.stlouisfed.org/foregone/chapter_two.cfm.
    Warburg recast his latest plan: Warburg,
The Federal Reserve System,
1:89–90; see also Willis to Glass, January 20, 1913.
    Warburg’s point: Warburg,
The Federal Reserve System,
1:170.
    “The tantalizing puzzle . . . safe-deposit vaults”: This is my construction from two separate quotations: “tantalizing puzzle” is from ibid.; the longer part of the quotation is from the same volume, (p. 85), and in the same context—i.e., evaluating Glass’s regional plan—but was used there by Warburg in evaluating Morawetz’s plan back in 1909.
    Glass didn’t trust him: Primm,
A Foregone Conclusion,
chapter 2; see also Arthur S.Link,
Wilson,
vol. 2,
The New Freedom
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 205.
    Warburg returned the favor: Warburg,
The Federal Reserve System,
1:58.
    Wilson was eager: Woodrow Wilson to Glass, January 9, 1913, Glass Collection, Box 1. For the January 15 date of the draft, see Willis,
The Federal Reserve System,
147.
    to keep its provisions secret: Willis to Carter Glass, January 21, 1913, Willis Papers, Box 20; Willis to Glass, January 23, 1913, Willis Papers, Box 20; and James Laughlin to Willis, January 21, 1913, ibid., Box 7