A History of Strategy Read Online Free PDF

in building a fortified camp each night), and sound planning are emphasized.
    In particular, part 3 ends with a long list of do’s and don’ts. For example, “it is better to have several bodies of reserves than to extend your front too much;” and “troops are not to be led into battle unless they are confident of success.” The book’s succinct style, plus the fact that it was dedicated to an emperor and thus had a direct link with the prestige of Imperial Rome, plus the many useful suggestions it contains in regard to fortification in particular, explain why, for over a thousand years after it was written, it remained the most popular military handbook of all. As late as 1770 one Austrian field-marshal, the Prince de Ligne, went so far as to claim that “Vegetius had been inspired by God.” This was true even though, during the Middle Ages, the core of armies almost always consisted of cavalry rather than the infantry of which Vegetius wrote.
    Both the
Strategemata
and the
Epitoma
were written in Latin, which is another reason why they were so popular during the European Middle Ages. Not so, of course, the military treatises produced by the Byzantine Empire. The best-known, the
Strategikon
, is attributed to the Emperor Maurice (reigned 582–602). In fact it was composed in his name by others. Written not long after the great campaigns of Belisarius and Narses, it represents Byzantine military practice at its zenith. Part 1, comprising the introduction, describes the training, equipment, and discipline of the
tagma
, a cavalry formation. Parts 2 and 3 deal with the way in which the
tagma
ought to be prepared and positioned for battle. Part 4 advises the commander on how to deal with ambushes and set them up. Part 5 discusses the way baggage trains are to be arrayed, part 6 various tactics and drills to be used when confronting the enemy. The subject of part 7 is “generalship” (
strategia
). Far from dealing with matters of supreme import pertaining to the overall conduct of the campaign, however, it is subtitled “the points with which the general must consider.” This includes blessing the flags; organizing the squads; gathering enemy intelligence; making speeches to encourage the troops; interrogating prisoners; punishing offenders; watering the horses; and making sure that the men carry rations in their saddlebags.
    A general who has followed the
Strategikon
’s instructions up to this point ought to have his army ready and drawn up for battle. Accordingly part 8 deals with “points to be observed on the day of battle,” such as the need for the general not to overburden himself and to conceal his intentions for as long as possible. Part 9 deals with methods for launching surprise attacks, and part 10 with offensive and defensive siege operations including “building a border fortress by stealth and without open battle.” Obviously produced by a group of experts, all this material makes very good sense. And indeed traces of its influence on questions such as castrametation are said to be discernible in the conduct of actual campaigns such as the one against the Arabs in 636 AD.
    Even more interesting, both to the historian and probably also to the contemporary commander, is Part 11. It provides brief anthropological analyses of the principal enemies facing the Empire, their weaknesses and their strengths, and suggests ways for dealing with each one. For example, “the Persian nation is wicked, dissembling and servile, but at the same time patriotic and obedient.” Seldom bothering to look after their flanks, “they are vulnerable to attacks and encirclements from an outflanking position against the flanks and rear of their formations.” They should, if possible, be engaged on “open, smooth, and level terrain … without any swamps, ditches or brush which could break up the [Byzantine] formation.” By contrast, “the light-haired races place great value on freedom. They are bold and undaunted