in every network control
room in America loved it—and stayed with it, splitting the screen to show images of
the old and new presidents.
The new White House communications chief, Chis Lehane, did not love it. He was on
the hotline phone to ABC’s Roger Goodman, who was directing the pool coverage.
“Roger! The President of the Fucking United States is making a major fucking policy
announcement! That’s where your fucking coverage should be!”
“Not my call, Chris,” Goodman said. “We just send out the feeds; the networks take
what they want. And they want … Bubba.”
“Let it go,” President Gore said later when Lehane slipped into the glass-enclosed
reviewing stand during the Inaugural Parade and briefed him on Clinton’s upstaging.
“I’m sure it won’t be the last time we’re going to be frustrated.”
It wasn’t long before that turned out to be an unhappily prescient observation.
* * *
While President Gore and ex-president Clinton were competing for the attention of
millions, a small group of men, casually dressed in slacks and sweaters, were gathered
at a townhouse nine miles northwest of the capital, in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The
host and his guests were exiles of a sort; but for a few thousand votes in Florida,
they would have been preparing to guide the foreign policy of the United States under
President George W. Bush. Now, with President Gore assuming power, they snacked on
cold cuts as they engaged in a blunt assessment of how best to use the considerable
political resources at their disposal to pursue their shared highest priority. And
with them, elegantly dressed in a beige sport coat with blue pinstripes, was the one
man who had done more than any other to shape that priority.
For the top foreign- and defense-policy stars of the Republican Party, the Cold War
and the power balances among nation-states had been the defining reality of their
professional lives. They had been a part of the Reagan administration when that fifty-year
struggle with the Soviet Union had come to an end. They were part of the first Bush
administration when the president had rallied an international coalition to drive
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait; many of those at midlevel posts had bitterly
regretted the decision not to send the Third Army straight into Baghdad, ridding the
world of a psychopathic butcher once and for all. And for the eight years of the Clinton
administration, they had worked in political exile to argue for “regime change” and
had rallied the Congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, forcing President Clinton
to sign the bill, making it the official policy of the United States government to
depose Saddam.
And now that they were facing four more years away from the center of military and
diplomatic power, they were determined to make the removal of Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein a reality.
Their host that evening was Richard Perle, a twenty-five-year veteran of Washington
and a relentless advocate for what had come to be known as neoconservatism, the core
belief of which was the forceful use of American power and influence to challenge
the legitimacy of America’s foreign adversaries. With Perle were such luminaries as
Doug Feith, John P. Hannah, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Paul Wolfowitz—the last two having
been key figures in the Defense Department of George H.W. Bush.
After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Wolfowitz had dismissed the idea that a
self-financed terror group could have pulled off such an audacious attack on its own;
a nation-state had to have been behind such a strike, he reasoned, and that nation-state
almost certainly was Iraq.
One of the neocons’ allies, an academic named Laurie Mylroie, not only argued that
Saddam had been behind the World Trade Center strike; she also saw Iraq’s hand in
the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, for which Timothy McVeigh